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ABSTRACT 
Three Essays on Corporate Governance and Institutional Investors 
Vyacheslav Fos 
 
This dissertation analyzes the role of institutional investors in corporate governance. The first 
essay studies the effect of potential proxy contests on corporate policies. I find that when the 
likelihood of a proxy contest increases, companies exhibit increases in leverage, dividends, and 
CEO turnover. In addition, companies decrease R\&D, capital expenditures, stock repurchases, 
and executive compensation. Following these changes, there is an improvement in profitability. 
The second essay investigates the optimal contract with an informed money manager. Motivated 
by simple structure of portfolio managers' compensation and complex risk structure of returns, I 
show that it may be optimal for the principal to stay unaware about the true risk structure of 
returns. The third essay analyzes the biases related to self-reporting in the hedge funds databases 
by matching the quarterly equity holdings of a complete list of 13F-filing hedge fund companies 
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Abstract
This paper studies the effect of potential proxy contests on corporate policies.
I find that when the likelihood of a proxy contest increases, companies exhibit
increases in leverage, dividends, and CEO turnover. In addition, companies
decrease R&D, capital expenditures, stock repurchases, and executive com-
pensation. Following these changes, there is an improvement in profitability.
The evidence is provided using a hand-collected data set of proxy contests
and an identification strategy which exploits exogenous changes in the legal
environment, resulting from the 1992 proxy access reform and the second
generation of state-level antitakeover laws in late 1980s. The study suggests
that the existing proxy contest mechanism plays a disciplinary role despite the
low frequency of materialized proxy contests.
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21. Introduction
The agency problem created by separation of ownership and control in public
corporations is at the heart of the corporate governance literature, which studies
mechanisms to discipline incumbents. One of those mechanisms is proxy contest.
During a proxy contest shareholders vote to resolve a conflict between the firm’s
board of directors, referred to as ‘incumbents’, and a group of shareholders,
referred to as ‘dissidents’. The average number of proxy contests was 55 (80)
per year during 1994-2008 (2006-2008) as compared to an average of 17 a year
during 1979-1994 (see Figure 1 and Mulherin and Poulsen, 1998). In contrast,
the frequency of hostile tender offers dropped sharply toward the end of 1980s.
For example, the average number of hostile tender offers went from 60 per year
in 1983-1987 to 5 per year in 2004-2008. Thus, the proxy contest has become
the most common hostile mechanism to discipline an incumbent board and
management.1
The consensus in the existing literature is that this mechanism is ineffective
in disciplining an incumbent board and management because the frequency of
materialized proxy contests is low (Bebchuk, 2007). Motivated by the existing
evidence and the recent financial crisis, the SEC received authorization from the
Dodd-Frank Act and adopted a significant proxy access reform in August 2010.
This reform addresses concerns about the effectiveness of the proxy contest
mechanism by facilitating the process of nominating directors by large long-
term shareholders.
Should we conclude that the proxy contest mechanism is ineffective? The
existing academic literature assumes that incumbents are passive and do not
act until a potential contest materializes. There is an alternative view of the
world – the theory of contestable markets – in which expectations of potential
events affect corporate policies (Baumol et al., 1988). If expectations of potential
1A partial list of prominent proxy contest events includes Hewlett-Packard (2001), Yahoo
(2007), Motorola (2007), Office Depot (2008), American Express (2007, 2009), Target (2009),
and Barnes & Noble (2010). Dissident shareholders’s proposals are usually related to election
of directors, changes in company’s bylaws, and M&A deals.
3events affect corporate policies, two empirical implications are straightforward.
First, since companies change corporate policies in anticipation of a proxy
contest, fewer companies are targeted ex post. Therefore, the low frequency
of materialized proxy contests does not imply that the proxy contest plays
a weak disciplinary role. Second, since changes in the corporate policies are
implemented before a proxy contest materializes, it is very hard to detect these
changes in the post-targeted period.
To correctly assess the effect of a proxy contest, I examine whether companies
change their financial policies in anticipation of the proxy contest. Using a
manually collected data set of all proxy contests from 1994 to 2008, I show that
when the likelihood of a proxy contest increases, companies increase leverage,
dividends, and CEO turnover. In addition, companies decrease investment
in research and development, capital expenditures, stock repurchases, and
executive compensation. Following these changes, there is an improvement in
profitability.
The estimation procedure I apply confronts three issues. First, the likelihood
of a proxy contest is a latent variable and therefore has to be estimated. Second,
the likelihood of a proxy contest can be endogenously determined, i.e., it can
be correlated with an unobserved component of corporate policies. Finally, the
effect of the likelihood of a proxy contest cannot be estimated using the regular
two-stage method that accounts for endogeneity because the likelihood of a
proxy contest is a latent variable.
The estimation procedure developed by Heckman (1978) and Amemiya
(1978) addresses the first and third concerns. This procedure is applied as
follows. First, I estimate a binary choice model (e.g., probit), where the
dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one when the company
is targeted in the proxy contest. Next, using estimated coefficients, I construct
a consistent estimator of the likelihood of a proxy contest. Finally, I assess the
effect of the estimated likelihood of a proxy contest on the corporate policies.
Importantly, the estimated likelihood of a proxy contest has to be constructed
such that it includes at least one covariate that does not affect the corporate
4policies. That is, I have to impose an exclusion restriction, which resolves the
endogeneity issue. I do this by using stock liquidity as a source of exogenous
variation in the likelihood of a proxy contest.
Theory suggests that liquid stock markets are generally beneficial for
corporate governance. Kyle and Vila (1991), Bolton and von Thadden (1998),
and Maug (1998) show that greater liquidity trading facilitates monitoring
by reducing free-riding. The general idea behind these papers is that liquid
stock markets make it easier for investors to accumulate large stakes without
substantially affecting the stock price. Kyle’s (1985) lambda, the price
impact measure, is the measure of liquidity that naturally corresponds to
this theoretical insight. The microstructure literature suggests that the best
empirical counterpart to Kyle’s lambda is the Amihud (2002) measure of stock
illiquidity.2
A valid excluded variable has to satisfy two criteria. First, it should
significantly affect the likelihood of a proxy contest. Second, it should affect
the outcome variable only through the likelihood of a proxy contest channel. I
show that the Amihud measure of stock illiquidity is very likely to satisfy these
criteria. First, the Amihud measure of stock illiquidity significantly affects the
likelihood of a proxy contest. Second, using a placebo test I show that the
Amihud measure of stock illiquidity is very likely to affect the outcome variable
only through the likelihood of a proxy contest channel.
The placebo test exploits the following changes in the legal environment. The
costs of hostile tender offers increased significantly after the widespread adoption
of antitakeover defenses and the second generation of state-level antitakeover
laws in late 1980s. In addition, the 1992 proxy reform reduced the costs of the
proxy contest by relaxing constraints on communications among shareholders
2First, it is based on widely available data and can be calculated for a large number of
stocks at a daily frequency. Second, Hasbrouck (2009) and Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) show
that the Amihud measure is highly correlated with measures of liquidity that are based on
intraday TAQ microstructure data. Recently, Goyenko et al. (2009) show that the Amihud
measure does well measuring price impact. In section 5.3 I show that results are robust to
using bid-ask spread as an alternative measure of stock liquidity.
5of public corporations (Bradley, Brav, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2010). As a result,
the frequency of proxy contests increased significantly after 1992. Thus, the
threat of either a hostile tender offer or a proxy contest was relatively weak
between the late 1980s and 1992. Therefore, I expect the effect of liquidity on
the outcome variables to be weak in the placebo sample.
The results of the placebo test show that stock liquidity did not affect any
of the outcome variables during the placebo period (1988-1992). Thus, it is
unlikely that an omitted variable drives the correlation between stock liquidity
and the outcome variables in the non-placebo sample. Therefore, the likelihood
of a proxy contest is the major channel through which stock liquidity affects
corporate policies.
The response to the threat of a proxy contest may be heterogeneous.
Therefore, I conduct a cross-sectional variation test to further support the
validity of the exclusion restriction. Specifically, I exploit heterogeneity in
company’s size and find that corporate policies in large companies are less
sensitive to changes in stock liquidity. This evidence is consistent with the
idea that it is hard to obtain control of a large company.
Having documented the effects of the likelihood of a proxy contest on the
corporate polices, I show that companies experience positive and significant
stock returns when a proxy contest materializes, without reversals in the long
run. Hence shareholders of ex post targeted companies benefit from a proxy
contest. In addition, I show that both materialized and potential proxy contests
benefit shareholders by improving profitability.
I show that controlling for the likelihood of a proxy contest is crucial.
Specifically, when companies are matched on the likelihood of a proxy contest
(i.e., each targeted company is compared to a non-targeted company with
similar likelihood of a proxy contest), significant improvements in the operating
profitability of targeted companies are detected. In contrast, when companies
are not matched on the likelihood of a proxy contest, I cannot detect significant
improvements in the operating profitability of targeted companies.
This paper contributes to the corporate governance literature. It shows
6that companies experience monitoring pressure even when no event is observed.
The rare proxy contests that actually occur are sufficient to create a threat,
which provides companies with monitoring pressure. Importantly, this pressure
causes significant changes in corporate policies. It suggests that the term
“contestable corporate governance” might be the best description of modern
hostile corporate governance. The evidence has important implications for
the ongoing policy debate about proxy access. It suggests that the existing
proxy access mechanism significantly affects corporate policies in all companies
despite infrequent fights between incumbent and dissident shareholders in which
dissidents obtain control.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description
of the data, along with an overview of the institutional background of proxy
contests. The ex post effect of the proxy contest on major corporate policies
is analyzed in Section 3. The empirical methodology that affords identification
of the ex ante effect of the proxy contest is developed in Section 4. Section 5
presents evidence on the ex ante effect of the proxy contest on major corporate
policies, profitability, and shareholder wealth. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Institutional Background and Sample Description
2.1. Institutional Background
In this section I summarize the procedure of the contested solicitation of
votes that was relevant during the 1994-2008 sample period. Rule 14a-8 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gives the shareholder who meets certain
threshold requirements the right to require management to include his proposal
in management’s proxy materials.3 Management, however, may exclude an
eligible proposal from the proxy materials if the proposal relates to an election
3Rule 14a-8 is commonly referred to as the “shareholder proposal rule.” It states that to be
eligible to submit a proposal, a shareholder either must have continuously held at least $2,000
in market value or 1% of the company’s securities for at least one year, or be a registered
holder. In both circumstances, the shareholder must continue to hold those securities through
the date of the annual meeting. In addition, the proposal itself must meet several requirements,
including a five hundred word limit.
7for membership on the company’s board of directors or the proposal directly
conflicts with one of the company’s own proposals.4
If the proposal is excluded from the proxy materials, the dissident share-
holder can initiate the proxy contest by soliciting the proxies using his own
proxy materials. During the proxy contest, dissidents and incumbents forward
proxy solicitation materials to shareholders, who sign and return the proxy form
of their preferred group. The agents for each group accumulate votes via the
returned proxies and cast these votes at the shareholders’ meeting.5
2.2. Sample Description
In the incident of contested solicitation of votes, the following forms are
submitted to the SEC through EDGAR: preliminary proxy statement in con-
nection with contested solicitations (PREC14A) and definitive proxy statement
in connection with contested solicitations (DEFC14A). I use submissions of these
forms to identify the proxy contest events.6
The sample is constructed as follows. First, I identify 4,666 filings of either
PREC14C or DEFC14A forms using an automatic searching script, which checks
existence of either PREC14C or DEFC14A forms in EDGAR for each company
in the Compustat universe. This method identifies all contested solicitations
of votes in the universe of Compustat companies. Next, I check the sample
of 4,666 filings manually and identify proxy contest events during 1994-2008.
There are 5.9 filings of either PREC14C or DEFC14A forms during an average
proxy contest. The final sample is the universe of all proxy contests during
4On August 25, 2010 the SEC adopted rules that allow shareholders access to a company’s
proxy materials to include their nominees to the corporate board of directors. These rules
permit a shareholder to submit nominees for up to 25% of the company’s board for inclusion
in the company’s proxy statement. The shareholder must hold 3% of the voting power at
the company’s annual meeting and have held such minimum amount continuously for at least
three years. This reform, however, does not affect this study, which covers 1994-2008 sample
period.
5Gantchev (2009) estimates the cost of an average proxy contest and reports that it is more
than $5 million.
6Alexander, Chen, Seppi, and Spatt (2010) and Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2010)
use a similar approach to identify proxy contests.
81994-2008 and consists of 792 unique proxy contests.7
Figure 1 presents the time distribution of proxy contests and hostile tender
offers. During the sample period, on average 55 unique proxy contests take
place each year, which corresponds to 0.65% of the Compustat universe. The
unconditional probability of the proxy contest increases from 0.2% in the early
1990s to 1.4% in 2007-2008. In contrast, the frequency of the hostile tender
offers decreases to a very low level in recent years: 21 hostile tender offers take
place during 2004-2008. The 1992 proxy reform is one potential explanation for
both the increasing frequency of the proxy contest and the decreasing frequency
of the hostile tender offers. This reform allowed independent shareholders to
freely engage in communication without being monitored by the SEC.
I use two approaches to examine how the characteristics of companies
targeted by proxy contests (hereafter “targets”) compare to those of non-
targeted companies. First, I compare the characteristics of targets with a set
of size/book-to-market/industry/year matched firms (Table 2). Second, I use
probit regressions to identify the partial effects of all covariates on the likelihood
of a proxy contest (Table 3).
A typical proxy contest target is a medium-size mature company with a
healthy cash flow. It is under-investing in new projects and suffering from
low market valuation and poor stock performance, which dissidents usually use
when they criticize the incumbent management. In addition, these targets are
characterized by high institutional ownership, high stock liquidity, and weaker
shareholder rights.8
The Amihud measure of stock illiquidity has the largest Average Partial
7This paper studies the proxy contest mechanism, which is a form of active “offensive”
monitoring, during which activist shareholders take up sizable positions in companies in which
they lacked a prior stake and agitate with sufficient vigor to end up involved in a proxy battle
(see Armour and Cheffins, 2011). There are alternative channels for shareholder monitoring,
including private negotiation (Carleton et al., 1998; Becht et al., 2009), and “Wall Street
Walk” (Edmans, 2009; Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2010).
8Note that most of characteristics of targeted companies are consistent with predictions
of Kahn and Winton (1998) and Gopalan (2005), who characterize companies that might
experience a control challenge.
9Effect (APE) on the likelihood of a proxy contest (Table 3). Particularly, a one
standard deviation increase in stock liquidity leads to an increase of 0.44% in
the likelihood of a proxy contest in the full sample. Since the unconditional
likelihood of a proxy contest is 0.65% in the full sample, the APE effect of the
stock liquidity is of high economic significance.
3. The Ex Post Effect of a Proxy Contest
In this section I present evidence on the ex post effects of the proxy contest.
Since most of the existing literature uses pre-1992 proxy reform data, I study
the ex post effect on corporate policies using a manually collected data set of
all proxy contests during the 1994-2008 sample period.9 The following equation
estimates the ex post effects of the proxy contest on corporate policies:
yit = Xitα1 + β1PostTargetit + ηt + ηi + εit, (1)
where yit is a outcome variable of interest, Xit is a vector of lagged covariates,
PostTargetit is a dummy variable that equals to one if the company is targeted
during years (t− 1, t− 3), ηt are time fixed effects, and ηi are firm fixed effects.
The coefficient β1 measures the ex post effect of the proxy contest.10
Table 4 presents the results of the estimates in equation (1). The
coefficients of the target dummy PostTargetit are insignificant in equations
where the outcome variables are leverage, cash, repurchase ratio, R&D, CEO
compensation, gross profit margin, return on assets, and cash flow. Dividend
9The effect of the proxy contest on stock returns has been widely studied (Dodd and
Warner, 1983; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1989; Ikenberry and Lakonishok, 1993; Mulherin and
Poulsen, 1998; Norli et al., 2010). Much less, however, is known about the effect of the proxy
contest on the major corporate policies. Exceptions are DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1989),
Mulherin and Poulsen (1998), and Bebchuk (2007), who study CEO turnover and show that
targeted companies increase CEO turnover, and Ikenberry and Lakonishok (1993), who study
dividend distributions and show that targeted companies decrease dividends. There is a
paucity of literature about the effect of proxy contests on other corporate policies, such as
leverage, repurchases, R&D expenditures, capital expenditures, and CEO compensation.
10Following Barber and Lyon (1996), I include the lagged left-hand side variable in the
vector of controls to match on lagged performance. This procedure controls for potential
mean reversion in the left-hand side variable.
10
payout ratio, capital expenditures, and CEO turnover are corporate policies that
are affected significantly. The untabulated evidence suggests that these changes
are driven by events in which dissident shareholders win the proxy contest.
The insignificance of most coefficients is not affected by considering the
fight outcomes, splitting the PostTarget dummy into three year dummies,
and augmenting equation (1) with a dummy variable that equals one if the
company is targeted during years (t + 1, t + 3). When I further explore the
augmented specification and test whether corporate policies change around the
event year, I find that only dividend payout ratio, capital expenditures, and
CEO turnover change significantly when companies are targeted. When the
company is targeted, dividend payout ratio and capital expenditures decrease
and CEO turnover increases.
Confirming evidence in the existing literature, I find that the ex post effect of
the proxy contest mechanism on the targeted companies is indeed weak. Thus,
the minor ex post effects of the proxy contest on corporate policies is not a
sample-specific phenomenon of the pre-1992 proxy reform sample period. The
empirical methodology that assesses the impact of the threat of a proxy contest
is presented in the next section.
4. Empirical Methodology
4.1. Structural Model
In this section I outline the model I use to identify the ex ante effects of the
proxy contest. The structural model, which is detailed in the Appendix, goes
as follows:
yit = Xitα11 + γ1PC∗it + ηt + ηi + u1it (2)
PC∗it = Xitα21 + Zitα22 + ζt + u2it (3)
where yit is an outcome variable of interest, PC∗it is an unobserved latent-
variable that captures the propensity of being the target of a proxy contest,
11
Xit is a vector of covariates that affect yit and PC∗it, Zit is a vector of covariates
that affect PC∗it only, ηt and ζt are time fixed effects, and ηi are firm fixed








where PCit is a dummy variable that equals one if the company is targeted.
The main goal of this paper is to identify and estimate the structural
coefficient γ1. If the incumbent management anticipates the proxy contest and
takes actions to change the company’s policies in order to preempt the proxy
contest, I expect γ1 6= 0. For example, consider dividend payout ratio. If
incumbents increase dividend payout ratio when the threat of a proxy contest
increases, I expect γ1 > 0.
4.2. Reduced Form Model
The reduced form model can be written as:
yit = Xitpi11 + Zitpi12 + ηi + ηt + v1it (5)
PC∗it = Xitα21 + Zitα22 + ζt + u2it (6)
where pi11 = α11 + α21γ1, pi12 = α22γ1, and v1it = u1it + γ1u2it.
4.3. Identification Strategy
To make a causal statement, the structural coefficient γ1 in equation (2) has
to be identified. Therefore, at least one exogenous variable needs to be excluded
from the outcome equation (see Hausman, 1983). A valid excluded variable has
to satisfy two criteria. First, it should significantly affect the likelihood of a
proxy contest. Second, it should affect the outcome variable only through the
likelihood of a proxy contest channel. I consider stock illiquidity as a candidate
for the exclusion restriction.
Theory suggests that liquid stock markets are generally beneficial for
corporate governance. Kyle and Vila (1991), Bolton and von Thadden
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(1998), and Maug (1998) show that greater liquidity trading facilitates control
challenges by reducing free-riding. The premise is that liquid stock markets
make it easier for investors to accumulate large stakes without substantially
affecting the stock price. Kyle’s (1985) lambda, the price impact measure, is
the measure of liquidity that naturally corresponds to this theoretical insight.
The best empirical counterpart to Kyle’s lambda is the Amihud measure of
stock illiquidity. First, it is based on widely available data and can be calculated
for a large number of stocks at a daily frequency. Second, Hasbrouck (2009) and
Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) show that the Amihud measure is highly correlated
with two measures of liquidity, which are based on intraday TAQ microstructure
data. Recently, Goyenko et al. (2009) show that the Amihud measure does well
measuring price impact. Therefore, I consider the Amihud (2002) measure of
stock illiquidity as a candidate for the exclusion restriction.11
The Amihud measure of stock illiquidity satisfies the first requirement. The
full sample summary statistics and probit regressions, reported in Tables 2 and 3,
suggest that targeted companies have significantly higher stock liquidity. Similar
evidence is reported by Norli et al. (2010), who show that liquidity increases
shareholders’ incentive to monitor management. When I check for a potential
weak effect of the Amihud measure of stock illiquidity on the likelihood of being
a proxy contest target, I find no evident weakness of the excluded variable in
the full sample (Stock and Yogo, 2002).12
Thus, the Amihud measure of stock illiquidity satisfies the first requirement
because it significantly affects the likelihood of a proxy contest. Consistently
with Kyle and Vila (1991), Bolton and von Thadden (1998), and Maug (1998),
the effect of the stock liquidity on the likelihood of a proxy contest is positive
(see Section 2.2). The final and the most challenging step is to check whether
11In section 5.3 I show that results are robust to using bid-ask spread as an alternative
measure of stock liquidity.
12However, the effect is weak in the Executive Compensation sample probably because
the variation in liquidity is low in the sample of large companies, which are covered by the
executive compensation database. Therefore, the evidence in this sub-sample should be taken
with a grain of salt.
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this measure affects corporate policies only through the likelihood of a proxy
contest channel.
I address this final concern by performing a placebo test, which exploits
two changes in the legal environment. First, the cost of a hostile tender offer
increases significantly after the widespread adoption of antitakeover defenses
and the second generation of state-level antitakeover laws in late 1980s. Second,
the 1992 proxy reform reduces the costs of communications among shareholders
(Bradley et al., 2010, empirically demonstrate the effect of this reform on proxy
contests by activist arbitrageurs). As a result, the frequency of proxy contests
increases significantly. These two changes suggest that the threat of a control
challenge is lower between late 1980s and 1992.
Table 5 reports the estimates of equation (5), which explore the reduced-
form correlation of the instrument with the outcome variables in the 1994-2008
sample. The estimated coefficients of the Amihud measure of stock illiquidity
are consistent with the hypothesis that liquidity is correlated with the outcome
variables.
Next, I estimate the reduced form equation in the 1988-1992 sample.13
If indeed the exclusion restriction is violated, we should observe significant
correlation between stock liquidity and the outcome variables in the placebo
sample. The violation of the exclusion restriction will be consistent with either
a direct effect of liquidity on the outcome variables, as well as an omitted variable
that affects stock liquidity and the outcome variables. In contrast, if the stock
liquidity affects the outcome variables only through the likelihood of a proxy
contest channel and there is no omitted variable that affects both stock liquidity
and the outcome variables, there should be a weaker correlation between stock
liquidity and the outcome variables in the placebo sample because the likelihood
of a control challenge is weak.
Table 6 suggests that stock liquidity did not affect any of the six outcome
13The results are not affected if the placebo sample starts in 1989.
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variables in the placebo sample.14 Thus, it is unlikely that an omitted variable
drives the correlation between the stock liquidity and the outcome variables.
Moreover, it is unlikely that the stock liquidity directly effects the outcome
variables. To address the possibility that relatively small sample size contributes
to the absence of significance in the placebo sample, I report estimates in 1996-
2000 and 2001-2005 sub-samples. The significance of the stock liquidity in these
sub-samples rules out this concern.
To provide further support to the placebo test, I estimate the following
regression in the 1988-2008 sample period:
yit = Xitpi11+PRE1992∗Xitpi12+Zitpi13+PRE1992∗Zitpi14+ηi+ηt+v1it, (7)
where PRE1992 is a dummy variable that indicates the pre-1992 sample period.
This specification tests whether the coefficient of the Amihud measure of stock
illiquidity changed significantly around the 1992 proxy reform. The evidence
in Table 7 is informative. First, it confirms that stock liquidity did not affect
the outcome variables in the placebo sample: the hypothesis that pi13+ pi14 = 0
is not rejected. Second, the change in the effect of the Amihud measure of
stock illiquidity on the outcome variables, pi14, is statistically significant for all
outcome variables but dividend payout ratio. While the change in the effect
of the Amihud measure of stock illiquidity on the dividend payout ratio is
insignificant, the sign of the change corresponds to the evidence in Table 6.15
Finally, I explore heterogeneity in the response to the threat of a proxy
contest and conduct the cross-sectional variation test. Large companies are
expected to be less sensitive to the threat of a proxy contest because it is
harder to obtain control in a large company. Therefore, I use heterogeneity in
size (SALES) to conduct the cross-sectional variation test. The cross-sectional
14Since the Compustat Executive Compensation database is available only from 1992, it is
impossible to perform the placebo test for the outcome variables from that database.
15The change in the effect of the Amihud measure of stock illiquidity on cash is insignificant
in all specifications and is reported for completeness of the analysis.
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variation test is performed by estimating the following reduced form equation:
yit = Xitpi11 + Zitpi13 + Itop30thpctl ∗ Zitpi14 + ηi + ηt + v1it, (8)
where Itop30thpctl is a dummy variable that equals one if the company belongs
to the top 30th percentile in terms of size (SALES).
The results are reported in Table 8. The evidence suggests that the
hypothesis pi13+pi14 = 0 is not rejected when the following corporate policies are
concerned: leverage, R&D expenditures, capital expenditures, dividend payout
ratio, repurchase ratio, CEO compensation, and CEO turnover. Thus, the
corporate policies of large companies are not sensitive to the threat of a proxy
contest.16
To summarize, both theory and empirical evidence suggest that the Amihud
measure of stock illiquidity is not likely to violate the exclusion restriction.
4.4. Estimation Procedure
The structural form equation (2) cannot be estimated using the regular
two-stage method because equation (3) is only partially observed. Therefore, I
follow Heckman (1978) and Amemiya (1978) and apply the following estimation
procedure.17 First, I estimate the reduced form equation (6) using a binary
choice model and obtain a consistent estimator P̂C∗it of PC
∗
it. Second, I estimate
the structural form equation (2) using P̂C∗it to obtain consistent estimators of
16There is an exception, however. The effect of stock liquidity on cash reserves is positive
and significant when large companies are concerned. In general, there is no clear prediction
regarding the effect of the threat of a control challenge on cash reserves. For example, firms
with poor corporate governance can dissipate cash quickly (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007;
Harford et al., 2008; Bates et al., 2009). Alternatively, such companies can build larger cash
reserves (Jensen, 1986).
17In Heckman’s model a latent variable determines the occurrence of the discrete event
and enters the equations as a right-hand-side variable. As an example, Heckman considers
a model of the effect of antidiscrimination legislation on the status of African-Americans.
He hypothesizes that the measured income in a state is affected not only by the presence of
the antidiscrimination legislation for that state, but also by the population sentiment toward
African-Americans in that state. Therefore, the objective is to study the effects of passage
of the antidiscrimination legislation per se after allowing for the sentiment in favor of the
antidiscrimination legislation.
16
structural parameters, α1 and γ1. Finally, I derive the asymptotic variance-
covariance matrix of the structural parameters that corrects the standard errors
for the generated regressor problem. In the Appendix I show that the unadjusted
standard errors estimate is consistent under the null of γ1 = 0.
5. Results
This section presents the main evidence. First, I show how the threat of a
proxy contest affects several corporate policies. Then I examine the impact of
the threat of a proxy contest on both the long-term profitability and the market
value of targeted companies. Finally, I perform several robustness checks.
5.1. Corporate Policies
I analyze the effect of the threat of a proxy contest on the following corporate
policies: the capital structure policy (leverage and cash reserves), the investment
policy (R&D and capital expenditures), the payout policy (dividend payout and
repurchase ratios), and the CEO compensation policy (CEO compensation and
CEO turnover).
The results are reported in Tables 9 and 10, where each column corresponds
to an outcome variable of interest. Table 9 reports the First Stage estimates
(equation (3)), which are used to a construct consistent estimate of the likelihood
of a proxy contest, P̂C∗. Table 10 reports the Second Stage estimates (equation
(2)), where the dependent variable is an outcome variable of interest.
First, I consider the capital structure policy. The evidence in Table 10
suggests that when the likelihood of a proxy contest increases, companies
increase leverage.18 Following one standard deviation increase in the likelihood
of a proxy contest, companies increase leverage by 2.4%.19 While the changes
18As a robustness check, I consider the gross book leverage and the market leverage. In
both cases the results unchanged.
19The economic magnitude of the likelihood of a proxy contest is γ1σPC/yit, where γ1
is estimated from equation (2), σPC is the standard deviation of the likelihood of a proxy
contest, and yit is the mean of the dependent variable. σPC is the standard deviation of
estimated residuals (ε̂it) in the following equation: P̂C
∗ = ηt + ηi + εit. That is, I rely only
on the within firm variation in the likelihood of a proxy contest.
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in leverage are significant, the current specification fails to detect significant
changes in the cash reserves.
Similar effects of the threat of a control challenge on the capital structure
are documented in literature that studies the implications of the second-
generation antitakeover legislation (see Garvey and Hanka, 1999; Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2003). Moreover, it has been shown that leverage increases in the
aftermath of entrenchment-reducing shocks to managerial security (see Berger
et al., 1997; Safieddine and Titman, 1999). The documented evidence is also
supported by the theoretical literature, which predicts a positive effect of the
threat of a control challenge on leverage (see Grossman and Hart, 1982; Jensen,
1986; Harris and Raviv, 1988; Stulz, 1988, 1990; Hart and Moore, 1995; Zwiebel,
1996; Morellec, 2004).
As far as the investment policy is concerned, companies spend less on
R&D and decrease capital expenditures when the likelihood of a proxy contest
increases. Following one standard deviation increase in the likelihood of a proxy
contest, companies decrease R&D expenditures by 4.4% and decrease the capital
expenditures by 8.2%. Thus, the threat of a proxy contest is associated with a
significantly lower level of investment.
These changes in the investment policy are consistent with evidence reported
by Safieddine and Titman (1999) and Garvey and Hanka (1999), who document
that when targets increase their leverage ratios to prevent the control challenge,
they also reduce capital expenditures.20 On the theoretical side, Jensen (1986)
suggests that if the threat of a proxy contest alleviates the over-investment
problem, it can reduce investments. Alternatively, Stein (1988) shows that the
threat of a proxy contest can lead managers to sacrifice long-term interests in
order to boost current profits.
The threat of a proxy contest significantly affects payout policy. Companies
increase dividends and decrease repurchases when the likelihood of a proxy
20See also Becht et al. (2009), who show that activist shareholders often require more
discipline in capital expenditures.
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contest increases. Following one standard deviation increase in the likelihood of
a proxy contest, companies increase dividend payout ratio by 2.8% and decrease
repurchase ratio by 6%.
A survey by Allen and Michaely (2003) suggests that management can
commit to pay out cash because of constant threat of some disciplinary action.
For example, Zwiebel (1996) and Myers (2000) show that management has an
incentive to pay dividends to prevent a control challenge. On the empirical
side, Francis et al. (2011) show that dividend payout ratios and propensities fall
when managers are insulated from control challenges. Moreover, the evidence
is in line with the recent literature on shareholder activism, which suggests that
activists often require companies to increase payouts to shareholders (see Brav
et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009; Becht et al., 2009).
Allen and Michaely (2003) provide a possible explanation for the opposite
effect of the threat of a proxy contest on dividends and repurchases: the
dividends can be a more effective mechanism than repurchases to impose
discipline. Allen and Michaely suggest that the market strongly dislikes dividend
reductions, and therefore management is reluctant to reduce dividends. Further
empirical support to this conjecture is provided by Brav et al. (2005), who show
that retail investors like dividends more than they like repurchases, and that
there are fewer consequences to reducing repurchases.
Finally, I consider the CEO compensation policy. The evidence suggests
that when the likelihood of a proxy contest increases, companies decrease
CEO compensation and increase CEO turnover. Following one standard
deviation increase in the likelihood of a proxy contest, companies decrease CEO
compensation by more than 5.4% and increase CEO turnover by 4.1%.
The evidence finds support in the existing literature. First, the results are
consistent with evidence provided by Borokhovich et al. (1997) and Bertrand
and Mullainathan (1999), who explore changes in antitakeover legislation and
show that CEOs of companies that face a lower threat of a control challenge
are paid more than CEOs at similar firms that face a higher threat of a control
challenge. Second, the recent shareholder activism literature documents similar
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changes in the CEO compensation policy (see Brav et al., 2008; Becht et al.,
2009; Klein and Zur, 2009). Finally, the evidence is consistent with the idea
that boards are more effective monitors when faced with the threat of a proxy
contest. First, Core et al. (1999) show that CEOs earn lower compensation
when governance structures are more effective. Second, Taylor (2010) implies
that the threat of a proxy contest might reduce the perceived cost of the CEO
turnover and lead to higher CEO turnover.
Taken together, the hypothesis that there is no ex ante effect of the proxy
contest is rejected. The threat of a proxy contest is associated with significant
changes in leverage, payout policy, investment policy, and CEO compensation.
Thus, despite being a rare event, the proxy contest plays an active role in modern
corporate governance and significantly affects major corporate policies.
5.2. Stock Returns and Operating Performance
The evidence in the previous section suggests that the proxy contest
mechanism significantly affects major corporate policies. The fundamental
question for the proxy contest mechanism is whether it creates value for
shareholders. To address this question, I examine stock market returns and
operating performance. I first analyze the effect of the proxy contest mechanism
on targets and then study the effect of the threat of a proxy contest on non-
targets.
I begin by examining the ex post effect of the proxy contest on targets. I use
short-term announcement event-day returns to show how the market perceives
the effect of the proxy contest on shareholders. Figure 2 plots the average
buy-and-hold return, in excess of the buy-and-hold return on the value-weighed
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index from CRSP, from 20 days prior to the proxy
contest announcement date to 20 days afterward. There is a run-up of about
4.2% between 10 days to 1 day prior to announcement. The announcement day
and the following day see a jump of about 3%. After that the abnormal return
keeps trending up to a total of 10.2% over 20 days.
Figure 2 also includes the average abnormal share turnover during the event
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window. I measure “normal” turnover over the (-100,-40) window preceding
the proxy material filing dates. The spike in abnormal trading volume, defined
as the percentage increase in the share turnover rate, occurs not only on the
filing day and the following day but also during the 10-day period before the
filing.21 Finally, Figure 2 highlights the importance of stocks being liquid. The
abnormal share turnover and the run-up of stock returns suggest that dissidents
benefit from stock liquidity. Consistent with the theory, liquid stocks permit
the accumulation of large stakes without substantially affecting the stock price
and capitalization on governance-related activities.
One potential explanation for the high abnormal return is a temporary price
impact caused by buying pressure. If the price impact is purely temporary
and reflects a trading friction rather than information about prospective value
changes, I should observe negative abnormal returns shortly after the event. In
contrast with this scenario, Figure 2 shows no reversal after 20 days (when the
abnormal turnover declines to close to zero). Moreover, the pattern persists
if I extend the window for another 20 days. Finally, untabulated evidence
from calendar-time portfolio regressions shows no evidence for possible mean
reversion in prices.
While equity prices suggest that shareholders of targeted companies benefit
from the proxy contest, I have not shown how the value is created. To provide
the evidence, I consider the operating profitability, measured by return on assets
(ROA).22 Table 12 reports estimates of the following equation:
ROAit = Xitα1 + β1P̂C∗it +
3∑
τ=k
γτDit+τ + ηt + ηi + εit, (9)
Estimated coefficients of dummy variables from this equation, γτ , are plotted in
Figure 3. The left plot presents the estimates from the unrestricted regression,
21The spike during the 10-day period before the filing is consistent with the fact that in
some cases Schedule 13D is filed simultaneously with the proxy contest initiation. See Brav
et al. (2008) for further details.
22Similar results are obtained when I use cash flow instead of ROA.
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which allows controlling for P̂C∗. The right plot presents the estimates from
the restricted regression, β1 = 0, in which controlling for P̂C∗ is not allowed.
The gray bars correspond to the specification in which k = −3 while the black
bars correspond to the specification in which k = 1.
Consider first the left plot in Figure 3, which presents the estimates from
the unrestricted regression and controls for the likelihood of a proxy contest. It
shows that after companies are targeted, there is a significant improvement in
operating profitability. This evidence is consistent with the positive abnormal
announcement return documented above. It is important to highlight that the
reverse causality critique does not work in this case. If dissident shareholders did
not change companies but just identified those that are going to improve, they
would save the enormous cost of a proxy contest by just buying stocks in these
companies. Therefore, I conclude that the dissident shareholders indeed know
how to improve both the valuation and the profitability of targeted companies.
The right plot in Figure 3 presents the estimates from the restricted
regression, in which β1 = 0, and therefore there is no controlling for the
likelihood of a proxy contest. The sharp difference in the estimated coefficients
in the post-targeted period highlights the importance of matching on the
likelihood of a proxy contest. When two companies with a similar likelihood of
a proxy contest are compared, the targeted company exhibits higher operating
profitability than one that is not targeted.
Table 11 reports the results of regressions exploring the cross-sectional
variation in market response to the proxy contest. The dependent variable is
the abnormal return in the (-20,20) window around the proxy contest announce-
ment. The negative coefficient of the Institutional Ownership Herfindahl Index
(INSTHERFL) suggests that shareholders are more surprised when the proxy
contest is announced in a company with more dispersed institutional ownership.
A positive coefficient of the leverage suggests that potential expropriation of
bondholders might be a source of shareholder gain.23 A positive coefficient of
23Untabulated evidence supports this hypothesis and shows a significant deterioration in
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cash reserves might also be explained by shareholders’ belief that more value
can be created in companies with high cash reserves, which possibly indicates
an agency problem.
Consider the coefficient of the likelihood of a proxy contest, P̂C∗. The
negative coefficient suggests that investors price the higher probability of a proxy
contest. Importantly, the effect of the threat of a proxy contest on equity prices
is positive: the more likely the proxy contest, the higher the value improvement
priced.
An alternative story suggests that the effect of the threat of a proxy contest
on equity prices is negative because the threat destroys value in targeted
companies. To differentiate between these alternative explanations, I consider
the effect of the threat of a proxy contest on the operating profitability of ex post
targeted companies during the pre-targeting period. Table 13 presents estimates
of the main structural equations, where the outcome variable is 4ROAt+1.
Column (2) reports results in the full sample, column (3) reports results in the
sample of ex post non-targeted companies, column (4) reports results in the
sample ex post targeted companies, and (5) reports results in the sample ex
post targeted companies cover pre-targeting years only.
Estimates in Table 13 suggest that the threat of a proxy contest is not
associated with a decline in the operating profitability of ex post targets. In
contrast, the positive and significant coefficient of the threat of a proxy contest
indicates that the profitability of the targeted companies actually improves when
the threat of a proxy contest increases. Thus, the overall evidence is consistent
with the positive effect of the threat of a proxy contest on both the profitability
and valuation of ex post targets.24
Finally, I consider the effect of the threat of a proxy contest on the
profitability of ex post non-targets. Similar to the positive effect on ex post
the credit-worthiness of the debt, which is measured by the Altman (1968) Z-score.
24To rule out a possibility that the improvement in the operating profitability is accompanied
by an increase in riskiness, I considered changes in standard deviation of the operating profit.
The unreported results suggest that there is no increase in the operating risk.
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targets, the threat of a proxy contest benefits ex post non-targets. Therefore, the
evidence suggests that the threat of a proxy contest is beneficial for profitability
of both ex post targets and non-targets.25
To summarize, the proxy contest targets experience positive and significant
stock returns when they are targeted. Importantly, there is no reversal in the
long run. This implies that shareholders of targeted companies benefit from
the proxy contest mechanism. Cross-sectional variation in returns suggests that
ex post targeted companies that act in anticipation of the proxy contest create
value for their shareholders. Similarly, the effect of the threat of a proxy contest
on the profitability of ex post non-targets is positive.
5.3. Robustness
In this section I perform several robustness checks. First, I estimate the
First Stage regression (3) in an out-of-sample manner. Particularly, for each
year t I estimate the First Stage regression using a sample that ends in t−1 and
then generate P̂C∗it for year t. Table 14 reports the results. All the results carry
through in this specification except for the effect of the threat of a proxy contest
on repurchase ratio, CEO turnover, and cash reserves. Particularly, the effect of
the threat of a proxy contest on cash reserves becomes statistically significant
and the effect of the threat of a proxy contest on the repurchase ratio and CEO
turnover becomes statistically insignificant.
Second, I estimate the linear probability model in the First Stage regression
to verify robustness to the First Stage specification. Table 15 reports the results.
The evidence suggests that neither statistical significance nor the economic
magnitude of the ex ante effect is affected. Thus, the estimation procedure
is robust to the First Stage specification.
Third, I include firm fixed effects in the First Stage linear probability
regression.26 Table 16 reports the results. All the results carry through in
25Fang et al. (2009) show that firms with liquid stocks have better performance as measured
by the firm market-to-book ratio.
26I use the linear probability model with firm fixed effects because most nonlinear models,
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this specification except for the effect of the threat of a proxy contest on the
CEO turnover, which remains positive but statistically insignificant. Thus, the
estimation procedure is robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects in the First
Stage specification. However, it comes at a cost: while the illiquidity is still
statistically significant in the First Stage, t-statistics are lower. This is expected
since firm fixed effects absorb part of illiquidity’s explanatory power.
For space reasons, I will summarize without directly reporting other
robustness tests I perform. First, I check whether the main conclusions change
if I perform the analysis on differences instead of levels. Particularly, I estimate
the following Second Stage regression:
4yit = 4Xitα1 + β14P̂C∗it +4ηt +4εit, (10)
where 4 is the first difference operator. The results are unaffected except for
both the effect of the threat of a proxy contest on the repurchase ratio. The
effect of the threat of a proxy contest on these outcome variables is insignificant
in this specification. Second, I use regular shareholder proposals instead of
the proxy contest events to show that the threat of a less hostile event has a
weaker effect on corporate policies. The evidence confirms the intuition: there
is no significant effect on leverage, dividend payout ratio, and R&D. Third, I
check whether the main conclusions change if I control for the post shareholder
proposal period. Particularly, I include in the set of control variables a dummy
variable that equals to one if a regular shareholder proposal was submitted
during years (t − 1, t − 3). I find that controlling for the post shareholder
proposal period does not affect the estimated coefficients of the ex ante effect
either statistically or economically. Fourth, I verify whether the results are
driven solely by targeted companies. Particularly, I exclude targeted companies
from the Second Stage regressions. As a result, neither the statistical nor
the economic significance of results is affected. Fifth, I study the potential
such as probit model, suffer from the incidental parameters problem.
25
inconsistency problem induced by the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable
in the Second Stage (see Arellano and Bond, 1991).27 Particularly, I exclude
lagged performance from the First and the Second Stage regressions. The results
are unaffected except for the effect of the threat of a proxy contest on leverage,
which becomes statistically insignificant. However, when I apply the Arellano
and Bond (1991) procedure, which uses lagged levels and the differences of
the left-hand side variable as instruments, the coefficient of leverage is positive
and significant. Sixth, I use the bid-ask-spread as an additional instrument
and perform the overidentifying restrictions test. The results are unaffected
except for the effect of the threat of a proxy contest on repurchases, which
becomes statistically insignificant. The null hypothesis that both instruments
are exogenous is not rejected at 5% significance level for all outcome variables
except repurchases. Finally, I augment the set of control variables. The basic
specification includes the following control variables: firm fixed effects and
lagged level of the performance measure (RHS variable), log market value of
equity, sales, book-to-market, and institutional ownership. The augmented
specification includes all controls from the basic specification and lagged levels
of repurchases, R&D, capital expenditures, ROA, cash flow, and GPM. I find
that this has no significant effect on the results: the effect of the threat of a
proxy contest on most corporate policies remains significant. The only exception
is R&D, which is affected negatively but insignificantly by the threat of a proxy
contest in this specification.
6. Conclusion
Motivated by the theory of contestable markets and using a manually
collected data set of all proxy contests from 1994 to 2008, I show that the
threat of a proxy contest impacts major corporate policies including capital
27In general, inclusion of lagged left-hand side variable in the set of control variables involves
the following tradeoff: it addresses the mean reversion concern (Barber and Lyon, 1996) but
generates inconsistency in the estimated coefficients. See discussion in Angrist and Krueger
(1999), page 1295.
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structure, investments, payout policy, and CEO compensation. Importantly, the
effect of the threat of a proxy contest on the major corporate policies is causal.
The identification strategy relies on the theoretical literature, which suggests
that liquid stock markets are generally beneficial for corporate governance, and
on empirical evidence, which supports the hypothesis that the Amihud (2002)
measure of stock illiquidity affects corporate policies only through the threat
of a proxy contest channel. The main empirical evidence that validates the
identification strategy comes from a placebo test, which explores changes in the
legal environment in the U.S.
I document that the proxy contest targets experience positive and significant
stock returns when they are targeted, with no sign of reversal in the long
run. This implies that shareholders of ex post targeted companies benefit
from the proxy contest mechanism. Positive stock reaction to the proxy
contest announcement is followed by significant improvements in the operating
profitability of targeted companies. Importantly, significant improvements in
the operating profitability of targeted companies are detected only when the
likelihood of a proxy contest is controlled for.
This paper opens a new avenue for future research. What is the optimal
frequency of control challenges? What is the most efficient way to create a
credible threat and discipline boards of directors? Do outcomes of materialized
proxy contests play any role in creating a credible threat? Answers to these and
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Appendix A. The Structural Model Construction
Consider a mixed structure model:
yit = Xitα11 + γ1PC∗it + δ1PCit + ηt + ηi + u1it (A.1)
PC∗it = Xitα21 + Zitα22 + γ2yit + δ2PCit + ζt + u2it (A.2)
where yit is an outcome variable of interest, PC∗it is a latent-variable that
captures the propensity of being a proxy contest target, Xit is a vector of
covariates that affect yit and PC∗it, ηt and ζt are time fixed effects, ηi are firm
fixed effects, Zit is a vector of covariates that affect PC∗it only, and PCit is a







The joint density of continuous random variables u1it and u2it is g(u1it, u2it),
which is assumed to be a bivariate normal density.28
Consider a typical year, during which the proxy contest activity is observed.
First, since the dissident shareholder who initiates the proxy contest during that
year uses information available at the end of the previous year, I include lagged
covariates in Xit and Zit and impose γ2 = 0. Second, since the ex post effect
can be observed only after the company is targeted, I impose δ1 = 0. Note
that Xit can include dummy variables that indicate post-targeting years. After
imposing γ2 = 0 and δ1 = 0, I obtain the following system of equations:
yit = Xitα11 + γ1PC∗it + ηt + ηi + u1it (A.4)
PC∗it = Xitα21 + Zitα22 + δ2PCit + ζt + u2it (A.5)
28Firm fixed effects are excluded from equation (A.2) because they introduce the incidental
parameter problem in this specification. In Section 5.3 I report estimates of the linear
probability with firm fixed effects and show that results are robust to their inclusion.
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Models of this kind, in which the latent variables as well as their dichotomous
observations occur in different structural equations, need some restrictions on
the coefficients to be logically consistent. To achieve the logical consistency,
the coefficient on the observed dichotomous variable in the reduced form of
the latent variable equation has to be zero (see Maddala, 1983). Therefore,
the necessary and sufficient condition for logical consistency is δ2 = 0. After
imposing this restriction, the logically consistent structural model is:
yit = Xitα11 + γ1PC∗it + ηt + ηi + u1it (A.6)
PC∗it = Xitα21 + Zitα22 + ζt + u2it (A.7)
Dependence of PC∗it and yit on the shocks that take place during the calendar
year t, i.e., corr(u1it, u2it) 6= 0, suggests estimating two structural equations as a
system of equations. For instance, unexpected market fluctuations can prevent a
dissident from initiating the proxy contest and simultaneously affect company’s
performance.
Appendix B. Asymptotic Properties of Estimated Coefficients
Consider a model:










 1, y∗2it > 00, otherwise
An econometrician observes y1it and dt but does not observe y∗2it. Assume
{x1it, zit} are known constants and {u1it, u2it} are bivariate variables with
corr(u1it, u2it) = ρ12, corr(u1it, u1is) = ρ1, corr(u2it, u2is) = ρ2, and
corr(u1it, u2is) = ρts12, t 6= s. The structural model in the vector notation
34
is:
Y1 = X1β1 + γ1Y ∗2 + U1
Y ∗2 = X1β21 + Zβ22 + U2 = Xβ2 + U2,




22). Note that the second equation is both
structural and reduced form equation. The reduced form of the first equation
is:
Y1 = X1β1 + γ1(X1β2 + Zβ22 + U2) + U1
= X1pi11 + Zpi12 + U1 + γ1U = Xpi1 + V1,




12) and V1 = U1 + γ1U2.
By inserting Y ∗2 = Xβ2 + U2 into the structural form equation of Y1 and
using V1 = U1 + γ1U2, I obtain:
Y1 = X1β1 + γ1Xβ2 + V1
= X1β1 + γ1Xβ̂2 + V1 − γ1X(β̂2 − β2)
= XĤα1 +W1,
where W1 ≡ V1 − γ1X(β̂2 − β2), α′ ≡ (β′1γ1), J1X = X1, and Ĥ ≡ (J1, β̂2).
Heckman’s (1978) estimator of α is defined as the least squares method applied
to Y1 = XĤα1 +W1:
α̂ = (Ĥ ′X ′XĤ)−1Ĥ ′X ′Y1
= α1 + (Ĥ ′X ′XĤ)−1Ĥ ′X ′(V1 − γ1X(β̂2 − β2))
= α1 + (Ĥ ′X ′XĤ)−1Ĥ ′X ′W1,
Note that since plimβ̂2 = β2 and plim(X ′V1) = 0, plimα̂ = α. Thus, the
35
estimator is consistent. The asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of α̂ is 29:
AV ar(α̂) = AE{(α̂− α)(α̂− α)′}
= (Ĥ ′X ′XĤ)−1Ĥ ′AE(X ′W1W ′1X)Ĥ(Ĥ ′X
′XĤ)−1.
Observe:
X ′W1W ′1X = (X
′V1 − γ1X ′X(β̂2 − β2))(V ′1X − (β̂2 − β2)′X ′Xγ1)
= X ′V1V ′1X + γ
2
1X
′X(β̂2 − β2)(β̂2 − β2)′X ′X
−2γ1X ′X(β̂2 − β2)V ′1X,
By taking the expectation, I obtain:
AE(X ′W1W ′1X) = AE(X




−2γ1X ′XAE{(β̂2 − β2)V ′1X}.
Observe that if γ1 = 0, I am back to the unadjusted standard errors:
AE(X ′W1W ′1X) = AE(X
′V1V ′1X) = AE(X
′U1U ′1X)







Thus, the following result follows.
Lemma The unadjusted standard errors estimate is consistent under the null
of γ1 = 0.
29AV ar(x) is the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of r.v. x and AE(x) denotes the
asymptotic mean (or the mean of the limit distribution) of r.v. x.
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Figure 1: Time Distribution of Proxy Contests. The dark bars (left axis)
plot the number of proxy contests initiated each year. The gray bars (left axis)
plot the number of hostile tender offers initiated each year. The dashed line
(right axis) plots the percentage of Compustat companies targeted in the proxy
contest each year. The hostile tender offers data are from SDC database.
37
Figure 2: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return around the Proxy Contest
Announcement. The solid line (right axis) plots the average buy-and-hold
return around the proxy contest announcement, in excess of the buy-and-hold
return of the value-weight market, from 20 days prior the announcement to 20
days afterwards. The bars (left axis) plot the increase (in percentage points)
in the share trading turnover during the same time window compared to the















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1: Variable Definitions.
Variable Definition
MV Market capitalization in millions of dollars.
CRSP AGE The number of years since first appearance on CRSP.
B2M The ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of
equity.
STOCK RETURN The 12 months buy-and-hold return.
INST The proportion of shares held by institutions.
AMIHUD Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, defined as the yearly





BID-ASK-SPREAD The quoted percentage spread, defined as the yearly average
(using daily data) of (Ask −Bid)/(0.5Ask + 0.5Bid).
LEVERAGE The net book leverage ratio defined as (book value of debt -
cash)/(book value of debt + book value of equity).
CASH The ratio of total cash and cash equivalents to total assets.
R&D Research and development expense scaled by lagged total
assets.
CAPEX The capital expenditures less the sale of PP&E divided by
mean total assets.
DIVIDENDS Dividend payout ratio, defined as the ratio of total dividend
payments to net income before extraordinary items.
REPURCHASE RATIO The ratio of net repurchases (see footnote 7 in Skinner, 2008,
for futher details) to income before extraordinary items.
GPM Gross profit margin, defined as (1-COGS/Sales).
ROA Return on assets, defined as earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, and amortization divided by lagged total assets.
CF Net cash flow (net income + depreciation and amortization)
divided by lagged total assets.
CEOPAY The total CEO contracted pay including options valued at
granting (“TDC1” from Compustat Executive Compensation
database), divided by sales.
NEW CEO A dummy variable equals to one if the current CEO is assigned
to the firm for the first year.
GINDEX The Gompers et al. (2003) governance index.
SALES-TO-ASSET The ratio of net sales to total assets.
HHISIC3 the Herfindahl index of net sales among all firms in the same
SIC 3-digit code.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Proxy Contest Targets. This table
reports the summary statistics of proxy contest targets and comparisons with
a set of matched companies. All variables are as defined in Table 1. The
first three columns report the mean, median, and standard deviation of the
target firms’ characteristics in the year before they are targeted. Columns
4 and 5 report the estimates of the following matching regression: yit =
α0 + α1Targetit + α2log(MVit) + α3B2Mit + ηt + ηsic3 + εit, where yit is the
relevant characteristic (i.e. leverage), Targetit is a dummy variable equals to
one if the company is targeted in a proxy contest during the year, log(MVit)
is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization, B2Mit is the book-to-
market ratio as defined in Table 1, ηsic3 are industry dummies, and ηt are year
dummies. When I describe target firms by size (MV), the log(MV ) variable is
dropped from the matching regression and when I describe target firms by book-
to-market (B2M), the B2M variable is dropped from the matching regression.
Column 4 reports the estimated coefficient α1, which is the difference in level
of the relevant characteristic between the targeted company and a regression-
based matched company, and column 5 reports its t-statistic. t-statistics are
calculated using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. The regression covers
all Compustat firm-year observations from 1994 to 2008 and includes both event
and non-event observations. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Summary Statistics Matching Regression
Firm Characteristic Mean Median Std. Dev. coefficient t-stat
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MV ($, millions) 1,650 148 5,258 -487.1** -2.30
CRSP AGE 17.69 13.00 15.47 4.0070*** 6.62
B2M 0.8235 0.6278 0.7358 0.1161*** 4.05
STOCK RETURN (annual) 0.0394 0.0777 0.5445 0.0077 0.34
INST 0.4158 0.3821 0.3430 0.0239** 2.25
AMIHUD 0.4575 0.2202 0.6228 -0.1516*** -6.94
BID-ASK-SPREAD (%) 2.4250 1.2860 3.2022 -0.3423*** -3.04
LEVERAGE 0.1734 0.1051 0.2053 0.0030 0.37
CASH 0.1722 0.0688 0.2233 0.0125 1.55
R&D 0.0335 0.0000 0.0841 -0.0108*** -3.31
CAPEX 0.0534 0.0402 0.1222 -0.0250*** -4.41
DIVIDENDS 0.1476 0.0000 0.2686 0.0061 0.56
REPURCHASE RATIO 0.2446 0.0000 0.7279 0.0690** 2.14
GPM 0.2460 0.3547 1.2184 0.0602 1.08
ROA 0.0489 0.0628 0.1577 0.0038 0.61
CF 0.0097 0.0270 0.1702 0.0036 0.49
CEOPAY 0.0052 0.0021 0.0122 -0.0005 -0.51
NEW CEO 0.2000 0.0000 0.3140 0.0989*** 3.20
GINDEX 9.51 9.00 2.57 0.5440*** 3.44
41
Table 3: Probit Analysis of Proxy Contests. This table reports estimates
of the probit regression: Pr(PCit = 1) = Φ(Xitα21 + ζt + εit), where the
dependent variable PCit is a dummy variable equals to one if the company
is targeted in a proxy contest during the year, Φ is the cumulative normal
distribution, Xit is a vector of lagged covariates, and ζt are time fixed effects.
These regressions cover all Compustat firm-year observations from 1994 to 2008
and include both event and non-event observations. All independent variables
are as defined in Table 1. Since the variables from Compustat Executive
Compensation database are only available for about one-third of firms on
Compustat, the multivariate regressions with variables from the Compustat
Executive Compensation database are reported separately. In each column, I
report probit coefficients, average partial effects (APE), and their t-statistics,
calculated using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors and within correlation
clustered by industry (SIC3). APE corresponds to the change in the likelihood
of a proxy contest due to a standard deviation change of a covariate. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Full Sample ExecComp Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
coefficient APE t-stat coefficient APE t-stat
MV -0.0747*** -0.0028 -2.85 -0.0598 -0.0027 -1.55
CRSP AGE 0.0061*** 0.0016 4.28 0.0042** 0.0013 2.08
BOOK-TO-MARKET 0.1545*** 0.0016 3.63 0.0406 0.0005 0.44
STOCK RETURN -0.1293*** -0.0015 -3.67 -0.2158** -0.0031 -2.51
INST 0.2035** 0.0012 2.28 0.0697 0.0005 0.49
AMIHUD -0.3009*** -0.0044 -4.23 -0.3230 -0.0059 -1.05
BID-ASK SPREAD 0.0123 0.0009 1.05 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0
LEVERAGE 0.1977 0.0007 1.36 0.2628 0.0012 1.07
CASH 0.1436 0.0006 1.20 0.1559 0.0008 0.64
R&D -0.1700 -0.0004 -0.74 -0.4676 -0.0014 -0.58
CAPEX -0.1131 -0.0003 -0.78 0.1870 0.0007 0.70
DIVIDENDS 0.0293 0.0001 0.30 -0.1007 -0.0005 -0.55
REPURCHASE RATIO 0.0638** 0.0006 2.10 0.0713 0.0008 1.45
GPM 0.0400*** 0.0012 3.72 0.1628 0.0059 0.88
ROA -0.3701* -0.0015 -1.76 -0.8141 -0.0040 -1.49
CF 0.3860* 0.0021 1.90 0.1290 0.0009 0.35
CEOPAY -5.3437 -0.0014 -1.11
NEW CEO -0.0373 -0.0002 -0.35
Constant -2.1359*** -13.55 -1.8929*** -5.85
Observations 54,686 18,532























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Placebo Test. This table reports estimated coefficient of the Amihud
(2002) measure of stock illiquidity in equation (5): yit = Xitpi11 + Zitpi12 +
ηi + ηt + v1it, where yit is a performance measure of interest, Xit is a vector of
lagged covariates, Zit is the Amihud measure of stock illiquidity, ηt are time fixed
effects, and ηi are firm fixed effects. The equation is estimated in four samples,
as defined at the top of each column. These regressions include both event and
non-event observations. All variables are as defined in Table 1. Coefficients
of the control variables (lag PERFORMANCE, lag log(MV), lag SALES, lag
INST, lag B2M, and constant) are not reported for space reasons. I report
estimated coefficient pi12 and its t-statistic, calculated using heteroscedasticity
robust standard errors and within correlation clustered by firm. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Effective Sample Placebo Sample
Sample Period 1994-2008 1996-2000 2001-2005 1988-1992
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Leverage -0.0060*** -0.0098*** -0.0042* 0.0018
[-4.46] [-3.58] [-1.82] [0.71]
Cash -0.0009 0.0033 -0.0001 0.0029
[-0.68] [1.22] [-0.05] [1.44]
INVESTMENT POLICY
R&D 0.0030*** 0.0090* 0.0062** 0.0018
[3.18] [1.73] [2.10] [0.98]
CAPEX 0.0078*** 0.0094** 0.0147*** 0.0035
[4.60] [2.41] [5.44] [1.12]
PAYOUT POLICY
Dividends -0.0032** -0.0038* -0.0038* -0.0013
[-2.35] [-1.90] [-1.72] [-0.47]
Repurchases 0.0200*** -0.0016 0.0224*** 0.0077




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11: Abnormal Return and Firm Characteristics. This table reports
estimates of OLS regression in which the dependent variable is the abnormal
return, in excess of the buy-and-hold return of the value-weight market, from
days prior the proxy contest announcement to days afterward. P̂C∗ is the
predicted likelihood of a proxy contest, calculated using estimates reported in
Table 3. INSTHERFL is the Herfindahl index of the institutional ownership.
MARKET BETA is the factor loading on the market access return. All other
variables are as defined in Table 1. I report estimated coefficients and their
t-statistics, calculated using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.




























Table 12: Ex Post Changes in Operating Profitability. This table reports
estimates of equation (9): ROAit = Xitα1+β1P̂C∗it+
∑3
τ=k γτDit+τ +ηt+ηi+
εit, where Xit is a vector of lagged covariates, P̂C∗it is the estimated likelihood
of a proxy contest, Dit+τ is a dummy variable equals to one if the distance from
the event year is τ years, ηt are year fixed effects, and ηi are firm fixed effects.
These regressions cover all Compustat firm-year observations from 1994 to 2008
and include both event and non-event observations. P̂C∗ is the First Stage
estimate of the likelihood of a proxy contest. All other variables are as defined
in Table 1. The First Stage estimates and coefficients of the control variables
(lag ROA, lag log(MV), lag SALES, lag INST, lag B2M, and constant) are not
reported for space reasons. In columns (1) and (2) I report estimates from the
unrestricted regression, while in columns (3) and (4) I report estimates from
the restricted regression, in which β1 = 0. In each column, I report estimated
coefficients γτ and their t-statistics, calculated using heteroscedasticity robust
standard errors and within correlation clustered by firm. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Unrestricted β1 Restricted β1 = 0
k = 1 k = −3 k = 1 k = −3









Dt+1 0.0284*** 0.0420*** -0.0027 -0.0037
[3.97] [3.93] [-0.49] [-0.47]
Dt+2 0.0261*** 0.0483*** -0.0050 0.0036
[3.00] [3.35] [-0.63] [0.27]
Dt+3 0.0309*** 0.0445*** -0.0013 -0.0021
[4.30] [4.36] [-0.24] [-0.28]
P̂C∗ -0.0559*** -0.0686***
[-7.15] [-6.51]
Observations 54,504 32,066 54,540 32,088
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Abstract
This article investigates the optimal contract with an informed money manager.
Motivated by simple structure of portfolio managers’ compensation and complex
risk structure of returns, I show that it may be optimal for the principal to stay
unaware about the true risk structure of returns. That is, the principal may
choose to write an incomplete contract which ignores existence of some risk
factors. Thus, the incompleteness of the contract raises endogenously. When
the money manager can expend effort and discover new risk factors, the optimal
risk sharing contract is characterized by the insufficient effort expenditure by
the money manager in discovering new risk factors.
Keywords:
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incomplete contracts
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1. Introduction
Compensation of portfolio managers is an ongoing topic of debate among
practitioners and regulators. A casual consideration of statistical models used
by practitioners suggests that the risk structure of returns is complicated. For
example, a typical product provided by an investment bank might consider
hundreds of risk factors. If such a structure of portfolio returns is taken seriously,
a classical contract theory suggests that a contract with portfolio managers
should be very complicated: the compensation structure should depend on a
verity of risk factors.
Professional portfolio managers, however, face relatively simple compensa-
tion contracts. For example, the “2-20” rule is independent (at least explicitly)
of the number of risk factors used by the portfolio manager to generate returns.
As a result, portfolio manager can affect his compensation fee by simply loading
on risk factors. This discrepancy between theory, which predicts dependence of
a contract on all risk factors, and actual contracts, which don’t exhibit such a
dependence, is at the center of this paper.
I show that optimal contracts with portfolio manager might exhibit an
endogenous incompleteness. The principal might choose to ignore possible
existence of a new risk factor when the benefit from discovering a new factor
is lower than the cost of verifying existence of that factor. That is, there is a
trade off between costs and benefits of being aware about the true risk structure
of returns. It implies that when the risk structure of returns is complex in a
sense that it is costly to know what the number of risk factors is, contracts with
portfolio managers will exhibit simplicity.
I also show that under curtain assumptions the optimal risk sharing contract
provides the portfolio manager with insufficient incentives to discover new risk
factors. Since in this paper I consider linear contracts only, incentives to expend
effort can be provide through either a fixed component of the fee or the share
of portfolio returns that goes to the portfolio manager. I show that neither the
fixed component nor the return component provides appropriate incentives.
57
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I present the
literature review. Section 3 presents the basic model in which the portfolio
manager cannot change the number of risk factors in the economy. Implications
of a secret risk factor which is available to the portfolio manager are discussed
in Section 4. In Section 5 I present the main part of the paper, in which
the portfolio manager can change the number of risk factors by costly effort
expenditure. Justifiability of contracts is discussed in Section 6. Finally, Section
7 concludes.
2. Related Literature
This paper is related to the delegated portfolio management literature. This
literature has studies the trade off between the optimal risk sharing and effort
expenditure by an agent (e.g., Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer, 1985; Cohen and
Starks, 1988; Stoughton, 1993; Heinkel and Stoughton, 1994; Li and Tiwari,
2009). The general conclusion is that deviations from the optimal risk-sharing
arrangement are required to improve efficiency in effort expenditure.1
This paper also contributes to the literature on the foundations of contract
incompleteness. The literature has proposed several reasons why contracting
parties may not specify everything that is relevant for the interaction in
the contract. Recent research has endogenized contractual incompleteness by
limited cognition and strategic investment in cognition by the contracting parties
(Bolton and Faure-Grimaun, 2010; Tirole, 2009). These papers take a less
radical approach towards unawareness than Dekel et al. (1998), as they assume
1Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985) show that deviations from the optimal risk-sharing
arrangement are required to reduce revelation of information. Cohen and Starks (1988) derive
conditions under which the manager exerts more effort but chooses a riskier portfolio than
investors prefer. Starks (1987) shows that the “symmetric” contract, while not necessarily
eliminating agency costs, dominates the “bonus” contract in aligning the manager’s interests
with those of the investor. Stoughton (1993) finds that the linear contract leads to a serious
lack of effort expenditure by the manager and shows that this under-investment problem
can be successfully overcome through the use of quadratic contracts. Heinkel and Stoughton
(1994) show that ex post performance measurement is critical to future recontracting. Li and
Tiwari (2009) show that the option-type incentive helps overcome the effort-under investment
problem that undermines linear contracts and that with the appropriate choice of benchmark
it is always optimal to include a bonus incentive fee in the contract.
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that agents are aware of the fact that they may be unaware of some relevant
elements of the contracting environment. In Gabaix and Laibson (2006) and
Filiz-Ozbay (2009), contractual incompleteness arises because better informed
agents shroud some contingencies or actions of the informed agents.
Recently, von Thadden and Zhao (2010) introduce the problem of unaware-
ness into Principal-Agent theory and discusses optimal incentive contracts when
the agent is unaware of her action space. Authors show under what conditions
it is optimal for the principal to propose an incomplete contract (that keeps the
agent unaware) or a complete contract. The key tradeoff is that of enlarging
the agents choice set versus adding costly incentive constraints.2 My paper
shows that it may be optimal for the principal to write an incomplete contract,
which ignores existence of a risk factors in the economy. Importantly, the
incompleteness raises endogenously in this set up.
3. The Basic Model
Investment opportunity set consists of risky assets and a zero interest rate
risk free asset. Return on any portfolio is r˜ = B′f , where {f˜i}Ni=1 are returns
on risk factors, {Bi}Ni=1 are loadings on risk factors, and N is the number of
risk factors. Risk factors are independent and normally distributed with mean
µi and volatility σi. The portfolio choice problem is reduced to the choice of
loadings on risk factors. This assumption implies that all portfolios that there
is no idiosyncratic risk and all portfolios are efficient. Therefore, there is no role
for benchmarking in providing incentives.3
There are two individuals in the economy: principal (capitalized letters)
and portfolio manager (non-capitalized letters). Preferences are described by
U = E(R˜)−Kσ2(R˜) and u = E(r˜)−kσ2(r˜). There are three possible scenarios:
2For a theoretical interpretation of the unawareness see, for example, Heifetz et al. (2006),
who introduce a generalized state-space model that allows for non-trivial unawareness among
several individuals, and which satisfies strong properties of knowledge as well as all the
desiderata on unawareness proposed in the literature.
3Effects of the benchmarking, however, have been analyzed (Roll, 1992; Admati and
Pfleiderer, 1997; Ou-Yang, 2003; Basak et al., 2007).
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(i) portfolio choice is made individually; (ii) individuals make portfolio choice
together; and (iii) the Portfolio Manager is hired by the Principal to make the
portfolio choice.4







The optimal loading on the risk factor is B = µKσ2 and the maximized expected
utility is U = µ
2
2Kσ2 ≡ U .5 Similarly, portfolio manager’s optimal loading on the
risk factor is b = µkσ2 and the maximized utility is u =
µ2
2kσ2 .
When two individuals share risk optimally, the maximization problem is:
max
BRS ,αRS









2 ≥ u = µ
2
2kσ2
The optimal loading on the risk factor is BRS = µKk
K+kσ
2 . Portfolio manager gets
share αRS = KK+k of the realized return. αRS implies that when an individual
becomes less risk averse, his share of the return increases. For example, if the
principal is risk neutral (K = 0), his share of the portfolio return is 100%.
Note that the optimal risk sharing does not increase the aggregate risk
taking in the economy. Since the individual loading on the risk factor of
each individual is b = µkσ2 and B =
µ
Kσ2 , the aggregating loading on the risk






2 = BRS . Moreover, since returns do not have an
idiosyncratic component, individuals don’t benefit from sharing the risk: the
maximized expected utility of each individual is unchanged.
4While this paper abstracts from implications of limited liability, the impact of limited
liability on agent’s incentives has been investigated. Grinblatt and Titman (1989) show that
if there is limited liability, the agent has an incentive to take on a riskier portfolio than
otherwise. The solution they propose is that the loss (to the agent) of under-performance
outweigh the gain from over-performance. Palomino and Prat (2003) consider the case in
which the agent has limited liability and show that there exists an optimal contract which
takes the form of a bonus contract.
5All proofs are in the Appendix.
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When the portfolio choice is delegated to the portfolio manager, the linear
contract between the principal and the portfolio manager is (α, T ), where α
is the fraction of the return paid to the portfolio manager and T is a fixed
fee paid to the portfolio manager regardless of the realized portfolio return
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987). The expected utility of the portfolio manager
is u = αE(R˜) + T − 12kα2V ar(R˜) = αbµ+ T − 12kα2b2σ2.
Given the contract, the portfolio manager makes the portfolio choice by
choosing b optimally. The FOC w.t. b yields b = µαkσ2 . Thus, the expected
utility of the portfolio manager as function of the contract is u = µ
2
2kσ2 + T .
Please note that effective risk-aversion of the portfolio manager, αk, depends
on his share of the portfolio return. Therefore, when α → 0 even very risk
averse portfolio manager might invest as if he is almost risk neutral.




(1− α)E(r˜)− T − 1
2
K(1− α)2σ2(r˜)
s.t.(IR) : αE(r˜) + T − 1
2
kα2σ2(r˜) ≥ uRS
where the reservation utility of the portfolio manager equals to his expected
utility when there is optimal risk sharing between two individuals, uRS . The
optimal contract satisfies αFB = KK+k and T = 0. The maximized utility
of the principal is U = µ
2
2Kσ2 . The utility of the portfolio manager is u =
µ2
2kσ2 . Similarly, when two risk factors are available, the First Best contract


















Note that when the manager chooses portfolio composition only, the linear
contract provides the manager with appropriate incentives. In general, principal
has no incentive to co-invest or hire the portfolio manager. Therefore,
individuals are indifferent between making the portfolio choice individually, co-
investing (risk-sharing), or hiring someone to manage the portfolio. This is the
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starting point of this paper.
4. Secret Risk Factor
In this section I analyze the following case: the portfolio manager becomes
aware of a new risk factor but the principal is unaware of it and therefore doesn’t
adjust the contract. The following proposition shows that the principal and the
portfolio manager have no incentive to adjust the contract when the portfolio
manager becomes aware of a new risk factor.
Proposition 1. If the portfolio manager discovers a new risk factor, the loading
on that factor is B2 = µ2kαFBσ22 . The maximized utility of the principal and the
utility of the portfolio manager are not affected by the fact that the principal is
not aware of the second risk factor.
Proof. See Appendix.
Next, I study a screening contract, which provides the portfolio manager
with incentive to reveal his true type. I assume that there are two types of
portfolio managers: the first type has access to one risk factor while the second
type has access to two risk factors. The principal’s problem in selecting the set










+(1− υ){[(1− αM )(BM,1µ1 +BM,2µ2)− TM ]
−1
2
K(1− αM )2(B2M,1σ21 +B2M,2σ22)}
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subject to:









































































where υ is the probability of facing a portfolio manager who has access to one
risk factor, (αm, Tm) is contract for the portfolio manager who has access to one
risk factor, and (αM , TM ) is contract for the portfolio manager who has access
to two risk factors.
Proposition 2. The optimal linear contract archives the optimal outcome even
when type of the portfolio manager is not verifiable. There is no benefit for
the portfolio manager from hiding new risk factors. There is no benefit for the
principal from being aware about the number of risk factors in the economy.
Proof. See Appendix.
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that the principal will stay unaware about the
number of risk factors in the economy if being aware is costly. Therefore, a
contract with portfolio managers will be endogenously incomplete in a sense
that it will ignore existence of the second risk factor in the economy.
5. Discovering Risk Factors
In this section I introduce the possibility of discovering new risk factors by
the portfolio manager. With probability p, which is common knowledge, there
are two risk factors and with probability (1−p) there is one risk factor. Suppose
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the portfolio manage can verify existence of the second risk factor if he expends
effort C. If the portfolio manager doesn’t expend the effort, he actually chooses
b2 = 0. The expected utility of the portfolio manager without expending the
effort C under the optimal risk sharing contract is u(c = 0) = µ
2
2kσ2 . The
following lemma shows what is the private benefit of the portfolio manager
from discovering a risk factor.
Lemma 3. If there is no incentive to discover new risk factors is provided, the
expected utility of the portfolio manager after expending the effort C is u(c =








Next, I show for what values of C the portfolio manager expends effort in
discovering new risk factors. By comparing u(c = C) and u(c = 0), I obtain
that when the principal is not aware of possible existence of new factors, the
portfolio manager will expend effort if and only if C ≤ C∗ ≡ p µ22
2kσ22
. A portfolio
manager is more likely to expend effort in discovering new risk factor if: (i) the
private cost of effort expenditure (C) is low, (ii) the probability that there are
two risk factors (p) is high, (iii) the portfolio manager is less risk averse (low k),
and (iv) Sharpe ratio of a new factor (µ2σ2 ) is high.



















∗. Since 1αRS > 1, when C ∈ (C∗, C∗∗) the
principal will find it optimal to look for the second factor but the portfolio
manager will find it suboptimal. Therefore, without appropriate incentives the
portfolio manager expends insufficient effort. Hereafter I assume C < C∗∗.
5.1. First Best Contract
In this section I assume that the portfolio manager’s effort is verifiable and
I derive an optimal linear contract with the portfolio manager who can discover
new risk factors. I first analyze the case of C 0 C∗ and then the case of
C∗ < C 0 C∗∗.
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Suppose C 0 C∗. I assume that if the portfolio manager rejects the proposed
contract, he invests himself and discovers as many risk factors as optimal for





. Since C 0 C∗,




















































+ (1− p)Tm = uPM
Proposition 4. The First Best contract satisfies: αM = αm = KK+k and TM =

















The First Best contract suggests that when C 0 C∗, the principal “free





Next, I consider the case when C∗ < C 0 C∗∗. In this case the principal
has to provide the portfolio manager with part of his own profits. I assume
that if the portfolio manager rejects the proposed contract, he invests himself
and discovers as many risk factors as optimal for himself. Thus, the reservation




Proposition 5. The First Best contract satisfies: αM = αm = KK+k , TM =
1















). The expected utility of the portfolio manager







The First Best contract suggests that when C∗ < C 0 C∗∗, the principal
pays to the portfolio manager for discovering new risk factors. This is zero-NPV
project from portfolio manager’s point of view. The maximized expected utility


















































, it is profitable
for the portfolio manager to expend effort even if only his private benefit is
taken into account. Therefore, the principal doesn’t compensate the portfolio













principal compensate the portfolio manager for the effort expenditure. However,
the portfolio manager is paid just enough to be indifferent between expending








, it is profitable for neither principal nor portfolio manager
to discover new risk factor.
5.2. Second Best Contract
In this section I consider the optimal contract when portfolio manager’s



















































+ (1− p)Tm = uPM
66
subject to two (IC) constraints that hold ex-ante (before expending effort):




























and subject to two (IC) constraint that hold ex-post (after expending effort):


















Proposition 6. The Second Best contract holds if and only if C ≤ C∗. In this
case the Second Best contract coincides with the First Best contract. If C > C∗,
the principal cannot provide incentives to the portfolio manager to discover the
risk factor.
Proof. See Appendix.
Please note that Proposition 6 implies that the optimal risk sharing contract
is characterized by under-discovery of risk factors when a class of linear contracts
is concerned (Stoughton, 1993; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1997). When C∗ < C ≤
C∗∗ the social loss from the non-verifiability of the number of risk factors is







The intuition behind this result goes as follows. First, two ex-post (IC)
constrains imply Tm = TM . That is, a fixed component of the compensation
should be independent of number of risk factors. Otherwise, the portfolio
manager will find it beneficial to claim that he is of type that should receive
higher T . Next, two ex-ante (IC) constraints imply that if Tm = TM , the
portfolio manager doesn’t get any additional incentive to discover risk factors.
That is, he takes into account only his private benefits and expends effort only












and the cost of being aware (being able
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principal will find it optimal to stay unaware of risk factor discovering. In this
case the contract will be incomplete in a sense that it will ignore existence of
the second risk factor in the economy. Importantly, this incompleteness raises
endogenously.
The incompleteness of the contract can be measured by the probability that
the outcome is socially sub-optimal and the magnitude of social loss. The first
component depends on the distribution of C (given C∗ and C∗∗, how likely it is
that C∗ < C ≤ C∗∗?) and principal’s risk aversion (K), which determines the
magnitude of the “problematic” region (C∗, C∗∗]. Since C∗∗ is decreasing in K,
less risk averse principal will be more concerned about the unawareness. For
a given C ∈ (C∗, C∗∗], the social loss from the inability to verify the portfolio







6. Justifiability of Contracts
In the contest of unawareness a reasonable equilibrium concept should
include the requirement that the Agent finds the contract justifiable, in the
sense that the contract is optimal for the Principal (Agent) from the Agent’s
(Principal’s) point of view (e.g., ?). In this section I study the implication of
this requirement for my analysis.
It is simple to see that the solution to the basic contracting problem in
section 5.2 is justifiable in this sense. Both portfolio manager and principal
understand that if the effort expenditure is unverifiable, it is optimal to have
an incomplete contract when C∗ < C ≤ C∗∗ and the cost of being aware (being







That is, the principal is unaware about the second risk factor and knows that
it is optimal for him stay unaware.
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7. Conclusion
This paper shows that optimal contracts with portfolio manager might
exhibit an endogenous incompleteness. The principal might choose to ignore
existence of some risk factors when the benefit from discovering these factors is
lower than the cost of verifying existence of these factors. That is, there is a
trade off between costs and benefits of being aware about the risk structure of
returns. I also show that under curtain assumptions the optimal risk sharing
contract provides the portfolio manager with insufficient incentives to discover
new risk factors.
The findings imply that when the risk structure of returns is complex in a
sense that it is costly to know what the number of risk factors is, contracts with
portfolio managers might exhibit simplicity. Therefore, complex risk-structure
of returns and simple compensation contracts can co-exist. Moreover, if the cost
of discovering new risk factors increase, contracts will exhibit more simplicity.
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Appendix A. Proof of Results in Section 3
Proposition 7. When the principal makes the investment decision, the optimal
loading on the risk factor is B = µKσ2 . The maximized expected utility of the
principal is U = µ
2
2Kσ2 ≡ U .
Proof. The expected return and the variance of principal’s portfolio are E(R˜) =






The FOC w.t. B yields B = µKσ2 . By substituting B the maximized expected
utility of the principal is obtained.
Proposition 8. When two individuals share risk optimally, the loading on the
risk factor is BRS = µKk
K+kσ
2 . The portfolio manager gets share αRS =
K
K+k
of the realized return. The maximized expected utility of each individual is
unchanged.
Proof. The maximization problem is:
max
BRS ,αRS


























By substituting αRS and BRS the expected utility of each individual is obtained:




2Kσ2 and u =
µ2
2kσ2 .
Proposition 9. When one risk factor is available, the First Best contract




Proof. The maximization problem is:
max
α
(1− α)E(r˜)− T − 1
2
K(1− α)2σ2(r˜)
s.t.(IR) : αE(r˜) + T − 1
2
kα2σ2(r˜) ≥ uRS
where the reservation utility of the portfolio manager is defined as u when there
is optimal risk sharing between two individuals, uRS . Since (IR) constraint is
binding, T = uRS + 12kα
2σ2(r˜)− αE(r˜) and principal’s expected utility is:
U = (1− α)E(r˜) + αE(r˜)− 1
2




σ2(r˜)[α2k + (1− α)2K]− uRS
= bµ− 1
2
b2σ2[α2k + (1− α)2K]− uRS







































The FOCs w.t. α yields:





































(K+k)2 = αFB . Therefore, the maximized expected utility
of the principal is U = µ
2
2kαFBσ2
− uRS = µ
2
2Kσ2 .
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that the portfolio manager has found an additional risk factor and
knows that the principal is unaware of that factor. The correctly specified return
on the portfolio is r˜ = B1f˜1 +B2f˜2, where f˜2 ∼ N(µ2, σ2) and cov(f˜1, f˜2) = 0.




















+ αFBB2µ2 − 12kα2FBB22σ22 . Since αFB > 0, the FOC w.t. B2 yields








Therefore, the expected utility of the portfolio manager is as one under the First
Best contract with aware principal.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 2










+(1− υ){[(1− αM )(BM,1µ1 +BM,2µ2)− TM ]
−1
2
K(1− αM )2(B2M,1σ21 +B2M,2σ22)}
subject to:









































































FOCs w.t. Bm,1, B̂m,1, BM,1, BM,2, B̂M,1, and B̂M,2 yield: Bm,1 = µ1kαmσ21 ,
B̂m,1 = µ1kαMσ21 , BM,1 =
µ1
kαMσ21
, BM,2 = µ2kαMσ22 , B̂M,1 =
µ1
kαmσ21
, and B̂M,2 =
µ2
kαMσ22
. Thus, the first (IC) constraint is:
µ21
kσ21

































































From the inspection of two (IC) constraints it is clear that these constraints will






























































(IC) : Tm = TM











































If υ > 0, the FOC w.t. αm is:































If (1− υ) > 0, the FOC w.t. αM is:










































Thus, the linear contract is still the optimal one.
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Appendix D. Discovering Risk Factors
Lemma 10. If there is no incentive to discover new risk factors is provided, the
expected utility of the portfolio manager after expending the effort C is u(c =







Proof. The expected utility of the portfolio manager after expending the effort
C is:
u(c = C) = −C + p
{
αME(r˜) + TM − 12k
2α22σ




αmE(r˜) + Tm − 12kα
2
mσ
2(r˜) | r = 1
}
= −C + p
{






















FOCs are bM,1 = µ1kαMσ21 , bM,2 =
µ2
kαMσ22
, and bm,1 = µ1kαmσ21 . After substituting
the FOCs we obtain:


























When no incentives to discover new risk factors are provided, αm = αM = αRS









Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 4
Since C 0 C∗, the principal implements discovering the new risk factor in











































































































− uPM = − [pTM + (1− p)Tm]
Let’s substitute the (IR) constraint:
max
αM ,αm





































































































FOCs yield αm = αM = αFB = KK+k . The (IR) constraint implies:







− uRS = 0
Therefore, the principal sets TM = Tm = 0. The maximized expected utility of
the principal is:





















Since ( 1αFB − 12
[





) = 12αFB , the maximized expected utility is:
































Appendix F. Proof of Proposition 5
Since C 0 C∗∗, the principal implements discovering of risk factors in the
























































Following same steps as in the previous proposition we obtain the optimal
incentive component of the contract αm = αM = KK+k . The (IR) constraint
implies:














Any combination of TM and Tm that satisfies the (IR) constraint works.













= 12αFB and (
1
αFB
− 1) − 12 Kk ( 1αFB − 1)2 = Kk , the
maximized expected utility of the principal is:


























































































Appendix G. Proof of Proposition 6
(IC3) and (IC4) imply Tm = TM . After simplifying (IC1) and (IC2)
we obtain C ≤ C∗ ≡ p µ22
2kσ22
, which holds by the initial assumption. If
C ∈ (C∗, C∗∗), (IC) constraints are violated. Therefore, the optimal linear
contract cannot resolve the problem of the sub-optimal expenditure of effort by
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+ TM = uPM
(IC3& IC4) : Tm = TM

















































FOC w.t. αm is:



























m , (IC) constraint implies Tm = TM . From (IR)
























 This paper formally analyzes the biases related to self-reporting in the hedge funds databases by 
matching the quarterly equity holdings of a complete list of 13F-filing hedge fund companies to the union 
of five major commercial databases of self-reporting hedge funds between 1980 and 2008. Conditional on 
self-reporting, we find significant evidence of a timing bias in both reporting initiation and termination 
(delisting):  Funds initiate self-reporting after positive abnormal returns which do not persist into the 
reporting period; while termination of self-reporting is followed by both return deterioration and outflows 
from the funds.  Unconditionally, the propensity to self-report is consistent with the trade-offs between 
the benefits (e.g., access to prospective investors) and costs (e.g., partial loss of trading secrecy and 
flexibility in selective marketing).  Finally, self-reporting and non-reporting funds do not differ 
significantly in return performance, reflecting the offsetting factors motivating self-reporting.  
                                                 
1 Comments and suggestions from Gerald Gay, John Griffin, Bob Hodrick, and seminar and conference participants 
at Columbia University, CRSP Forum, FMA 2010 Annual Meetings, Tel Aviv University, and the 2nd Annual 
Conference on Hedge Funds have contributed to this draft.  The authors thank Linlin Ma for excellent research 
assistance. 
2 J. Mack Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University, 35 Broad Street, Atlanta, GA 30303.  Tel:  404 
413 7326; Email:  vagarwal@gsu.edu. 
3 Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, 3022 Broadway, New York, NY 10027.  Tel:  212 854 8057; 
Email: vfos14@gsb.columbia.edu. 
4 Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, 3022 Broadway, New York, NY 10027.  Tel:  212 854 9002; 
Email:  wj2006@columbia.edu. 
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Hedge funds are pooled private investment vehicles.  Unlike other financial institutions such as banks and 
mutual funds, they have largely escaped the regulations by raising capital via private placement (under the 
Securities Act of 1933) and from a limited number of “qualified investors,” i.e., accredited institutions 
and high-net worth individuals (under the Investment Company Act of 1940).  Due to their lightly 
regulated nature, hedge funds are not required to report information about their characteristics, strategies, 
and performance to any authority or database. As a result, hedge funds are among the least transparent 
major market participants though according to some estimates by Credit Suisse / Tremont, they managed 
1.5 to 2.0 trillion dollars of assets and accounted for about one-third of the equity trading volume in the 
U.S. during 2007. 
 The importance of hedge funds has attracted a growing volume of research; and due to the lack of 
mandatory disclosure, the burgeoning research on hedge funds has mostly relied on commercial hedge 
fund databases to which hedge funds report voluntarily.  Prior research has documented several biases in 
hedge fund databases including the survivorship bias, backfilling bias, and smoothing bias (e.g., 
Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999), Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999), Fung and 
Hsieh (2000), Liang (2000), Getmanksy, Lo, and Makarov (2004), and Bollen and Pool (2008)). However, 
the extant literature has not formally addressed the degree of self-reporting bias, arguably one of the most 
important biases in hedge fund databases. Self-reporting bias is a type of selection bias that results from 
hedge funds’ choices to not report to any database, to initiate reporting at some time, or to discontinue 
reporting for various reasons, the common ones being liquidation and closed for new investment. Such a 
bias can potentially affect any study on the performance and risk characteristics of hedge funds but the 
magnitude or even the direction of the bias is yet unknown. Our paper fills this gap in the hedge fund 
literature by being the first to assess the extent of self-reporting bias in a comprehensive sample of hedge 
funds as well as to analyze the determinants of their self-reporting.  
 A hedge fund’s choice to voluntarily report to a commercial database is likely to be non-random. 
Like all other economic activities, the reporting behavior of hedge funds should be determined by the 
cost-benefit trade-offs.  On the benefit side, listing in a database enhances a fund’s exposure to potential 
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investors, which is likely to be more significant for small and medium sized fund companies that desire 
more publicity but lack the resources for aggressive direct marketing.5 The main cost of reporting is a 
partial loss of secrecy and privacy that many hedge funds value.6
Even after a fund decides to report to a commercial database, it exercises the discretion on the 
reporting initiation date and later may choose to exit from the database for both positive and negative 
reasons.  On the positive side, if a hedge fund is closed to new investors due to its success and lack of 
scalable investment opportunities, then there would be no incentive to attract more capital.  On the 
negative side, embarrassing losses or even the prospect of liquidation could be the reason for a hedge fund 
to stop reporting.   
  Moreover, keeping the reporting status 
constitutes a commitment to revealing a fixed set of information at fixed time intervals, depriving a hedge 
fund of the flexibility in publicizing selective information (such as return performance of a particular 
period of time) that is most favorable to the fund.  Finally, investors attracted to hedge funds through 
database subscription tend to be more “retail” and short-term. Hedge funds usually value institutional 
investors whose investing or divesting decisions are not sensitive to short-term performance.  Hence, 
some hedge funds may not want to be exposed to the clientele that are typical of database subscribers.   
These scenarios related to the choice of reporting, as well as initiation and discontinuation of 
reporting indicate a potential selection bias among self-reporting databases.  However, the magnitude, or 
even the direction of the bias, is hard to assess a priori (Fung and Hsieh (2000)).  This paper is a first 
attempt at quantifying the degree of the self-reporting bias in the hedge funds databases by analyzing the 
quarterly equity holdings of a complete list of hedge fund companies that file the Form 13F to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) between 1980 and 2008.  Because of the mandatory nature 
                                                 
5 In order to be exempt from the regulations of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and the 1940 Investment Company 
Act (and their amendments), a hedge fund cannot advertise to the general public through mass media such as 
newspapers and TV channels.  Moreover, the investors that the fund approaches directly must satisfy the 
requirement of “qualified investors”. Therefore, reporting to a commercial database is often viewed as a cheap way 
to reach the target investor groups, where the database vendors bear the responsibility of ensuring that only qualified 
investors have access to their databases.   
6 Though self-reporting hedge funds in general do not reveal holdings information to hedge fund databases, the 
reported information, such as descriptions of style classification, asset allocation, monthly returns, and 
leverage/hedging ratios, is often revealing of the funds’ investment strategies.   
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of the 13F filings,7
  Upon classifying hedge funds’ self-reporting status and imputing returns and other portfolio 
statistics from the quarter-end holdings of all hedge funds that file 13F forms, we conduct a two-step 
analysis.  First, we analyze the return dynamics around the initial and last reporting dates and the impact 
of reporting on fund flows for the subsample of self-reporting funds.  We then compare the performance 
and other characteristics of the self-reporting hedge funds to those of the non-reporting ones.   
 this sample is largely free from the selection bias due to hedge funds’ reporting 
incentives.  Among all 13F-filing hedge fund companies, we determine their self-reporting status by 
matching them to the union of five major hedge fund databases – CISDM, HFR, Eureka, MSCI, and 
TASS. This represents the most comprehensive database of self-reporting hedge funds that has been used 
in the literature and hence minimizes the inaccuracy in the classification of funds’ self-reporting status.   
Conditional on self-reporting, we find significant evidence that performance deteriorates both 
after the initial reporting date and after the reporting termination date.  The deterioration amounts to 73 
and 24 basis points respectively, using monthly market-adjusted returns. These results indicate two forms 
of timing bias in returns reported to commercial databases. The first form of timing bias in reporting 
initiation suggests that hedge funds strategically initiate self-reporting after a run of superior performance; 
while the second form of timing bias indicates that reporting termination or “delisting” is usually a sign of 
deterioration.  The latter is further supported by the fact that net flows to funds tend to decrease after 
reporting termination, even after controlling for performance. Good performance prior to initiation of 
reporting to some extent offsets the poor performance subsequent to termination of reporting, which 
biases the performance data accessible from the commercial databases toward average performance.  
. Unconditionally, we find that young and medium-sized fund companies that employ more 
diversified and higher-frequency trading strategies (using portfolio turnover rates as proxy) have a 
stronger incentive to self-report to databases, presumably to publicize their funds and attract potential 
investors.  Given the characteristics of these funds, trading secrecy is less likely to be revealed through 
                                                 
7 All institutions that have investment discretion over $100 million or more in Section 13(f) securities (mostly 
publicly traded equity; but also include convertible bonds, and some options) are required to disclose their quarter-
end holdings in these securities. 
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voluntary disclosure because of their diversified nature and the high portfolio turnover rates, both of 
which reduce the costs of reporting.  Interestingly, the difference in the return performance, though 
slightly in favor of the non-reporting funds, is small.  Presumably the positive and negative reasons 
prompting reporting initiation and termination largely offset one another. This is good news for the large 
body of research on hedge fund performance because the self-reporting bias may not have a material 
impact when it comes to performance evaluation especially if researchers use a multitude of commercial 
databases to exhaustively cover the universe of self-reporting hedge funds.    
  The findings of our paper have implications for the growing research on hedge funds which 
examines their risk-return characteristics and persistence in their performance.8
Our approach avoids the limitations discussed above using a comprehensive sample of hedge 
funds that are mandatorily required to report their positions in 13F securities to the SEC. Needless to say, 
this approach has its own limitations as it relies on the quarter-end long-equity positions at the hedge fund 
company (rather than at the individual fund) level.  As such, our estimates should be considered as self-
reporting biases in the long-equity component of the portfolios of hedge fund companies. Given that the 
 Our study contributes to 
the earlier work on hedge fund data biases by Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999), Brown, 
Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999), Fung and Hsieh (2000, 2009), Liang (2000), Malkiel and Saha (2005), 
and Posthuma and Jelle van der Sluis (2003) among others. Researchers have made progress on 
addressing the self-reporting bias by using the data on funds of hedge funds (FOFs) (Fung and Hsieh, 
2000; Aiken, Clifford, and Ellis, 2010) based on the premise that the returns and holdings of FOFs 
contain information of non-reporting hedge funds and of hedge funds that terminate reporting.  These 
studies are limited to relative small samples of FOFs and rely on assumptions about randomness of the 
underlying funds that are selected by the FOFs.   
                                                 
8 An incomplete list of studies examining hedge fund performance includes Amin and Kat (2003), Agarwal and 
Naik (2004), Agarwal, Bakshi, and Huij (2009), Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2010), Agarwal, Fung, Loon, and Naik 
(2010), Avramov, Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2009), Bollen and Whaley (2009), Fung and Hsieh (1997, 2001, 2004), 
Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2008), Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004), Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007), 
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), Patton (2009) and those examining persistence in hedge fund performance include 
Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007), Boyson (2008), Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov (2010). For a survey of the 
hedge fund literature, see Agarwal and Naik (2005). 
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potential limitations of the different approaches are unlikely to be correlated, findings from alternative 
approaches could be viewed as complementary in obtaining a more comprehensive picture of the self-
reporting biases.   
 Our paper also determines the performance of funds both before they initiate reporting and after 
they cease reporting. Timing bias associated with delisting studied in this paper is related to the work by 
Hodder, Jackwerth, and Kolokolova (2008), who estimate the returns of hedge funds after their 
disappearance from the databases using data on FOFs that invest in a portfolio of hedge funds, assuming 
some independence between the component funds’ self-reporting status and the FOFs’ investment 
decision.  One limitation of their approach is that they need to estimate the holdings of FOFs since this 
data is not commercially available. Moreover, the validity of their assumption is questionable if the FOFs 
are more likely to pull out the money from funds before or shortly after they disappear from the databases 
due to the funds’ bad performance.  Our approach, in contrast, avoids these limitations by exploiting the 
mandatory disclosure of equity holdings of hedge fund companies without any estimation of holdings.  
 In terms of using the hedge fund companies’ 13F quarterly equity holdings, our paper is related to 
Griffin and Xu (2009) who use returns imputed from holdings of hedge funds to infer their overall 
performance.  In addition to having a different sample (1,199 funds versus 306 funds in Griffin and Xu 
(2009)), the focus of our paper is also different as we relate the analysis of performance to the propensity 
and effects of voluntary reporting by hedge funds.   
 Our research contributes to the literature in several ways. It is the first study that uses a 
comprehensive sample of hedge funds to analyze the biases in hedge fund databases due to self-reporting, 
including the timing bias and the unconditional selection bias.  Our results will offer important 
benchmarks and references for hedge fund researchers and investment managers who use such data 
sources.  More generally, the study provides insights into the motivation and consequences of voluntary 
disclosure by hedge funds, and in the same spirit, by other financial institutions.  Finally, it raises 
interesting questions about the role of hedge fund regulation if voluntary disclosures are deemed 
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inadequate.  This is particularly pertinent in view of the ongoing debate regarding the mandatory 
registration of hedge fund managers and more stringent disclosure rules.   
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section I details data collection and classification, 
and provides an overview of the complete sample of 13F filing hedge fund companies.  Section II 
develops hypotheses regarding the various types of data biases based on a discussion of the economics of 
self-reporting.  Section III analyzes the change in performance of self-reporting funds before and after 
their initial and last reporting dates, as well as the effects of reporting initiation and termination on fund 
flows.  Section IV compares the characteristics and return performance of self-reporting and non-
reporting hedge fund companies.   Finally, Section V concludes. 
 
I.  Data and Overview 
A. Collection of Hedge Funds  
 The key inputs to our analyses are data from two sources.  The first is the 13F quarter-end equity 
holdings data from the Thomson Reuters Ownership Data (formerly the CDA/Spectrum database), 
available through the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).  The Form 13F filing, which discloses 
quarter-end holdings of an institution with a maximum of 45-day delay, is mandatory for all institutions 
that exercise investment discretion over $100 million of assets in equity and some other publicly traded 
securities.9
                                                 
9 More accurately, institutions are required to disclose all securities that appear on the official list of “Section 13(f) 
Securities,” published by the SEC periodically. This list includes almost all publicly traded equity, some preferred 
stocks, bonds with convertible features, warrant, and publicly traded call and put options.  The Thomson Reuters 
Ownership database contains only holdings of equity, and does not include other securities.  See Aragon and Martin 
(2009) for an analysis of the original 13F filings for a random sample of 250 hedge fund companies.   
  The second source is a comprehensive self-reported hedge fund database created by the union 
of five major commercial hedge fund databases:  CISDM, Eureka, HFR, MSCI, and TASS (henceforth, 
the “Union Hedge Fund Database” or simply the “Union Database”).  Throughout the paper, we call a 
hedge fund company that appears in the first database a “13F-filing hedge fund company,” and a hedge 
fund that appears in the second data source a “self-reporting hedge fund.”   
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 It is worth noting that the level of reporting is often different between the two data sources.  The 
13F filings are usually aggregated at the institution level, comparable to the level of management 
companies or sponsors of hedge funds.  The reporting unit in the self-reporting databases is usually at the 
fund level or at the level of pooled portfolio.10
 The Thomson Reuters Ownership database consists of a list of 5,188 unique 13F-filing 
institutions for the 1980 -2008 period. We go through the list manually in order to identify whether each 
filing institution has major hedge fund management business.  There is no official definition of a hedge 
fund.  We adopt the generally accepted notion of hedge funds as pooled private investment vehicles that 
adopt performance-based compensation and that are operated outside of the securities regulation and 
registration requirements. As such, we classify a 13F-filing institution as a “hedge fund company” if it 
satisfies one of the following:  (i) It matches the name of one or multiple funds from the Union Hedge 
Fund Database.  (ii) It is listed by industry publications (Hedge Fund Group (HFG), Barron’s, Alpha 
Magazine, and Institutional Investors) as one of the top hedge funds.  (iii) The company’s own website 
claims itself as a hedge fund management company or lists hedge fund management as a major line of 
business.
 Hence, pairing a 13F filing institution to funds in the 
Union Hedge Fund Databases is often a one-to-multiple match (if a match exists).  The matching between 
the two data sources is facilitated by the fact that the latter database reports the sponsors or management 
companies of individual funds in most cases. 
11
                                                 
10  A fund is usually defined at the level where participating clients combine their investment dollars and 
purchase/sell pooled portfolio units, rather than individual securities. The unit price is determined by dividing the 
market value of the pooled portfolio by the number of outstanding units.  
 (iv) The company is featured by news articles in Factiva as a hedge fund manager/sponsor.  (v) 
Some 13F filer names are those of individuals.  In such cases we search the full individual names over the 
internet (mostly through the filer and co-filer identity information on various types of SEC filings) and 
classify the name as a hedge fund if the person is the founder, partner, chairman, or other leading 
personnel of a hedge fund company.  Notable examples in this category include Carl Icahn (founder and 
11 Even if a company’s website does not formally mention hedge fund management as part of their business, we still 
classify the company as a hedge fund manager or sponsor if it manages investment vehicles whose descriptions fit 
our definition of hedge funds.  We exclude private equity and venture capital businesses that also have performance-
based compensation.   
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chairman of the hedge funds Icahn Capital, L.P. and Icahn Partners) and George Soros (founder and 
chairman of Soros Fund Management, a hedge fund management company). 
 Applying the above procedure yields 1,199 unique hedge fund companies among all 13F filing 
institutions.  This number is low relative to the universe of hedge fund companies (our Union Database 
consists of 4,918 hedge fund companies).  The difference is due to the minimum requirement of $100 
million in equity positions for 13F-filing institutions, which rules out smaller hedge fund companies and 
most of the hedge fund companies which primarily invest in non-equities.  Given that we use the long-
equity holdings for our analysis, it is comforting to notice that the largest percentage of our sample funds 
belong to the “Equity” or “Equity Long/Short” category (38.4%). Other major categories include Event 
Driven (10.2%), Sectors (5.4%), and Multi-Strategy (5.7%), which are also likely to have substantial 
equity exposure.  
Our sample is restricted to relatively “pure-play” hedge funds (such as Renaissance Technologies 
and Pershing Square, and investment companies where hedge funds represent their core business, such as 
D. E. Shaw and the Blackstone Group/Kailix Advisors), and do not include full-service banks whose 
investment arms engage in hedge funds business  (such as Goldman Sachs Asset Management and UBS 
Dillon Read), nor do we include mutual fund management companies that enter the hedge fund business, 
a new phenomenon in recent years (Agarwal, Boyson, and Naik (2009), Cici, Gibson, and Moussawi 
(2010), and Nohel, Wang, and Zheng (2010)).  The reason for the exclusion is that the equity holdings of 
these full-service institutions in their 13F filings may not be informative about the investments of their 
hedge funds. Our results are qualitatively similar if we include the institutions with major hedge fund 
business in the list of hedge funds, except their presence will skew the statistics related to portfolio size 
because they tend to be much larger than the other hedge funds on the list.   
 Due to our top-down approach, our list of 13F filing hedge funds companies is considerably 
longer than those used in prior literature.  For example, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) analyze the role 
of hedge funds during the late 1990s technology bubble with a sample of 53 hedge fund companies, and 
Griffin and Xu (2009) examine the portfolio characteristics and performance of 306 hedge fund 
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companies.  In both papers, the authors use a one-sided match from published hedge fund lists to the 13F 
database for the purpose of their research and did not classify hedge funds that fail to make to a major 
published list or choose not to report to any database.  Given that the focus of this paper is to analyze the 
selection bias, it is particularly important that we adopt the top-down approach to compile a complete list 
of 13F-filing hedge funds.   
 Equally important for our research is the composition of a comprehensive sample of self-
reporting hedge funds given that a key variable of our analysis is the self-reporting status of a hedge fund.  
Most of the research in the area of hedge funds has been conducted using one or more of the self-reported 
databases.  For example, Fung and Hsieh (1997) use monthly data from TASS Management and 
Paradigm LDC, Ackermann et al. (1999) use a combination of HFR and MAR databases, Liang (1999) 
uses HFR data and Liang (2000) compares the HFR and TASS databases for different biases in the data.  
More recently, Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) show that there is limited overlap among four 
commercial databases, and using one or two of them may result in exclusion of a large number of self-
reporting hedge funds. We extend the approach of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) by adding one more 
database (Eureka) to their list of four and use the union of five major databases to minimize the under-
classification of the self-reporting status. Using multiple databases also enables us to resolve occasional 
discrepancies among different databases. Finally, critical importance of using multiple databases is 
emphasized by Fung and Hsieh (2009) who document that some funds, classified as defunct/graveyard 
funds by a database because they stopped reporting to this database, may be active and reporting to 
another database. We minimize such misclassification by using the superset of performance histories of a 
fund from the five databases. 
 The Union Hedge Fund Database contains a sample of 11,417 hedge funds, which includes 6,245 
equity-oriented hedge funds, over our sample period.12
                                                 
12 We take advantage of using multiple databases to fill the missing strategy information if the fund is covered by 
more than one database. However, despite this exercise, we still have strategy field missing for 483 out of the 11,417 
funds in our sample and therefore we cannot determine if these funds are equity-oriented. 
  Figure 1 plots a Venn diagram that shows the 
percentages of funds report to each database individually and to all possible combinations of multiple 
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databases.  One of the most striking observations from Figure 1 is that 71% of the funds are covered 
exclusively by only one database with CISDM and MSCI having the maximum (25.8%) and minimum 
(5.8%) fraction of unique funds.13
[Insert Figure 1 here.] 
 This underscores the importance of using multiple databases in order to 
achieve a comprehensive coverage of the hedge fund universe. 
 
B. Classification of the Self-Reporting Status of Hedge Funds 
 We next classify the self-reporting status of all the 1,199 hedge fund companies that file 13F by 
matching them to the Union Database.  The classification entails two steps.  In the first step, we match by 
name allowing minor variations.  For example, “DKR Capital” from the 13F list is matched to “DKR 
Capital Inc.” in the Union Database.  The name-matching produces 645 self-reporting fund companies, or 
53.8% of all 13F filing fund companies.  
 In the next step, we compute the correlation between returns imputed from the 13F quarterly 
holdings (henceforth, “13F portfolio returns”) and returns reported in the Union Database (henceforth, 
“self-reported returns”).  For the former, we compute the monthly returns of a fund company assuming it 
holds the most recently disclosed quarter-end holdings.  For the latter, we compute the average monthly 
returns of all funds reported in the Union Database that belong to the same fund management company, 
weighted by their assets under management. 60 pairs (or 9.3% of the 645 self-reporting fund companies) 
turn out to have negative correlations14
                                                 
13 A major determinant in the choice of databases to which funds report is the subscriber clientele of the databases 
(in terms of both characteristics and geography). Most of the funds choose not to report to multiple databases 
because of the additional cost due to the different requirement imposed by different data vendors on reporting funds, 
such as the types of data fields, availability of audited financial statements, etc.  
, and for 219 pairs, the correlation is not defined due to lack of 
overlapping periods of data from both data sources. The self-reporting status of these funds is not 
convincingly established and therefore we exclude them from our main analysis (that is, they are 
14 Griffin and Xu (2009) report the same percentage number in their sample as 8.5%. They discuss different reasons 
for correlation being less than one, including some funds within the 13F companies missing from commercial 
databases and short-term trading being not captured in the 13F database. 
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considered neither self-reporting nor non-reporting). As a result, we end up with 366 self-reporting funds 
and 554 non-reporting funds.   
 Figure 2 plots the distribution of all 13F-filings and the subset of self-reporting hedge fund 
companies over the years.  Also plotted is the average portfolio size imputed from the 13F quarter-end 
holdings for both groups of fund companies, expressed in 2008 constant dollars using the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) deflator.   Figure 2 shows that both the number of 13F filing hedge fund companies and that 
of self-reporting fund companies have steadily increased over our sample period from 1980 to 2008, with 
a marked jump in the number of 13F filing hedge fund companies since 2001. Interestingly, the average 
portfolio size of self-reporting funds was higher than that of the non-reporting funds before 1988, but has 
been consistently lower than the latter since 1988.  
 Several forces underlie the changes in the relative size of the reporting and non-reporting funds. 
First, macro funds, which tend to be large in size, dominated the hedge fund industry prior to the 1990s.  
The trading strategies of these funds are hard to reverse engineer, implying lower costs of reporting to 
databases. In contrast, smaller long-equity short funds have become more popular since 1990s. These 
funds are more sensitive about trading secrecy and hence are less willing to report to databases. Second, 
there has been a structural change in the hedge fund investor profile in the 1990s. While high net-worth 
individuals were the predominant investors in the earlier period, institutional investors became the 
mainstay in the more recent time. This shift can potentially explain why large funds chose to report to 
commercial databases prior to 1988 to reach out to prospective retail investors but switched to alternative 
channels afterwards for marketing to institutional investors. 
[Insert Figure 2 here.] 
  Once we identify the self-reporting status of hedge fund companies and the periods during which 
they report to the Union Database, our analyses almost exclusively rely on the information from 13F 
filings.  As a result, the unit of observation is at the hedge fund management company level, which we 
will term interchangeably as “hedge funds” for the rest of the paper when there is no danger of confusion.   
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 The main advantage of relying on the 13F data source is that there is little bias associated with 
selective reporting as long as they meet the minimum hurdle of assets under management ($100 million). 
Therefore, comparing the portfolio composition and return performance of self-reporting with non-
reporting funds could offer an unbiased view of hedge fund performance and shed light on the selection 
bias introduced by self-reporting.  Having said that, it is important to interpret and view our results in 
light of the limitations of the Thomson Reuters Ownership database. This database only captures the 
long-equity portfolios of hedge fund companies and masks intra-quarter trading. Hence, we cannot 
conclude on the reporting-related biases at the aggregate portfolio level or at the individual fund level, 
given the limitations of our data.  
Our research methodology hinges on the proposition that long-equity positions are a substantive 
portion of the portfolios of equity-oriented hedge funds and that the returns imputed from quarter-end 
equity long positions are informative about the total returns of these hedge funds. This proposition is also 
the premise that underlies the earlier work by Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Griffin and Xu (2009). 
We believe that this proposition is valid on average for several reasons.   
First, among the self-reporting fund companies, we find that the average return correlation 
between their 13F holdings (equity-long positions only, and before fees) and their fund returns reported to 
hedge fund databases (aggregated at the fund company level and including returns from short positions 
and non-equity securities, and are net of fees) is 0.54; the median number is slightly higher at 0.57, and 
the inter-quartile range is 0.34 to 0.77.15
In addition, two pieces of evidence from hedge fund holdings data underscore the importance of 
long-equity positions for our sample funds.  We obtain the first evidence from retrieving and evaluating 
  The correlation is calculated using an average duration of data 
overlap of 12 years between a fund’s appearance in the Union Database and that in the 13F database.  
Both numbers are comparable to the correlation of 0.55 (mean) and 0.64 (median) reported in Griffin and 
Xu’s (2009) sample.   
                                                 
15 A further investigation reveals that the ten hedge fund companies that exhibit the highest return correlations 
(ranging from 0.96 to 0.99) all have funds in equity-oriented strategies including long/short equity, equity hedge, 
event driven, and sector. 
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the call/put option positions disclosed in the original 13F filings16
 Second, the contribution of equity positions to the total returns of hedge funds is evident from the 
equity market betas of hedge funds.  Using the monthly Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge fund indices from 
January 1993 to May 2009,
 (rather than the data processed by 
Thomson Reuters).  We find that 49% of the hedge fund companies in our sample never reported any 
option positions during our sample period.  The average value of call (put) options as a percentage of the 
total portfolio for all sample funds is 4.1% (4.0%), indicating limited benefits of including these options 
for the purpose of our research. The second piece of evidence is provided by Ang, Gorovyy, and van 
Inwegen (2010).  Using a proprietary dataset of funds of hedge funds, the authors report that hedge funds 
in the equity and event driven strategies (which constitute the great majority of our sample funds) mainly 
invest in equity and distressed corporate debt, and hence have relatively low leverage. 
17
 Finally, the constant resistance of hedge funds against ownership disclosure, including the 13F 
filings, implies that the equity positions are critically informative of their investment strategies.  Philip 
Goldstein, an activist hedge fund manager at Bulldog Investors likens his stock holdings to “trade secrets” 
as much as the protected formula used to make Coke, and condemning the 13F rule for taking the fund’s 
“property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.”
 we find that the market beta of the index of all equity-oriented hedge funds 
is 0.48. Similarly, the average market beta from the four-factor model of the return index of all the self-
reporting hedge funds in our sample is 0.40.  
18
                                                 
16 Please note that generally only exchange-traded options are required to be disclosed in the Form 13F.  Therefore 
the original 13F filings do not include all potential option positions of institutional investors. 
  In the 
wake of the “quant meltdown” in August 2007, 13F filings that publicize equity positions of major quant 
hedge funds took much of the blame for inviting “copycats” into the increasingly correlated and crowded 
strategy space, which eventually contributed to the “death spiral” in the summer of 2007 when many 
funds employing similar strategies attempted to cut their risks simultaneously in response to their losses 
17 Available from: http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/en/default.aspx?cy=USD.   




(Khandani and Lo (2007)).  A recent paper by Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, and Yang (2010) presents large-
sample evidence of strategic delays by hedge funds in their 13F disclosure. 
 
C.  Overview of Hedge Funds using Quarter-End Equity Holdings Data 
Before we compare self-reporting hedge fund companies to non-reporting ones, we take 
advantage of the complete list of 13F filing hedge funds to report the summary statistics of their equity-
portfolio characteristics and the return performance of their long-equity positions.  Further, we compare 
their statistics with those of other categories of 13F-filing institutional investors.  Such an analysis 
represents the most complete overview of the long-equity positions of hedge funds in the literature.   
The other categories that we compare hedge funds to include:  (1) banks and insurance companies 
(a combination of type 1 and type 2 institutions by the Thomson classification); (2) mutual fund 
management companies (type 3 institutions by the Thomson classification); (3) independent investment 
advisors (type 4 institutions by the Thomson classification, excluding hedge funds classified by us), and 
(4) others (the type 5 institutions by the Thomson classification, excluding hedge funds classified by us).  
The Thomson Reuters type code 5 since 1998 is known to be problematic in that the category could 
include many misclassified institutions that should be assigned with the other type codes (mostly, type 
code 4). Therefore, we reassign an institution which has type code 5 after 1998 to an earlier code if 
available and different from 5. The comparison is reported in Table I. 
[Insert Table I here.] 
 Table I shows that hedge fund companies are much smaller in size compared to institutions of 
other categories where size is calculated as the total value of the quarter-end equity portfolio using 
reported shares and corresponding quarter-end stock prices reported in CRSP.  In particular, the average 
size of a hedge fund company’s long equity portfolio is 16.5% of that of a mutual fund management 
company; though the difference in the total assets under management is likely to be smaller because the 
former may have exposures while mutual funds are more or less constrained to hold long positions in 
publically traded securities.   
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 Hedge funds also tend to be younger.  Because age changes mechanically with the reporting year 
for the same institution in a panel data, we simply consider the inception year of a filing institution as a 
proxy for age.  The inception year is left-censored at 1980 which is the earliest year that Thomson Reuters 
has data coverage.  The median hedge fund company started 13F filing 19 years after the median 
bank/insurance company; and the same differences with mutual fund companies and investment advisors 
are 17 and 7 years, respectively.  These differences are all statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 Three measures point uniformly to the more active nature of hedge funds in portfolio 
management.  First, they are significantly (at the 1% level) less diversified than all other categories as 
measured by median portfolio Herfindahl index, and the biggest difference is with respect to the mutual 
funds  (0.047 vs. 0.018).  The same relation holds using the mean statistic except for the comparison with 
the “Other” category.  Second, hedge funds’ portfolio volatility is higher than all other categories using 
both mean (5.53%) and median (4.93%) standard deviation of monthly returns imputed from quarter-end 
holdings, and the differences are all significant at the 1% level.   
 Third, hedge funds’ inter-quarter portfolio turnover rates, average (median) of 91.6% (81.5%) 
annually, is about twice as high as that of mutual funds, investment advisors, and other institutions, and 
more than three times that of bank and insurance companies, with all differences being significant at the 1% 
level.  Here, the portfolio turnover rate is compounded from the inter-quarter turnover rates19, calculated 
as the lesser of purchases and sales, divided by the average portfolio size of the last and the current 
quarter.20
                                                 
19 It is possible that some hedge funds may be very high-frequency traders by actively trading within the quarter and 
therefore may not report any long equity positions at the end of a quarter. However, this will only result in our 
underestimating the actual portfolio turnover rates of such hedge funds. 
 Purchases (sales) are calculated as the sum of the products of positive (negative) changes in the 
number of shares in the holdings from the previous quarter-end to the current quarter-end, and the average 
of the stocks prices at the two quarter-ends.  The logic of using the lesser (rather than the average) of 
purchases and sales is to free the measure from the impact of net flows.  The comparison between hedge 
20 We follow the practice of Morningstar, the leading mutual fund research company, in defining portfolio turnover 
rates. It is worth pointing out that our turnover figures for mutual funds are lower than those reported in the 
Morningstar database because the 13F data does not account for intra-quarter trading, which may significantly 
contribute to the funds’ turnover. 
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funds and mutual funds in terms of portfolio concentration and turnover rates is consistent with Griffin 
and Xu’s (2009) findings using similar measures.   
 Does hedge funds’ more active management bring about superior returns?  The answer is not 
obvious from Table I.  We compute monthly excess return for each institution as the difference between 
the imputed portfolio return and the CRSP value-weighted equity market return.  For the former, we 
assume that in each month, the institution holds the portfolio disclosed at the most recent past quarter-
end21 and calculate the buy-and-hold return for the month.  It turns out that all categories have average 
and median excess returns close to zero.22  Moreover, hedge funds outperform all the other institutions on 
average, though only the differences between the average excess returns of hedge funds and those of 
investment advisors and other institutions are statistically significant.  If we use median excess return as 
the metric, hedge funds outperform all other institutions significantly. When we use one-factor and four-
factor alphas as the performance metric, hedge funds seem to underperform other institutions on average, 
with all pair-wise differences being significant except the difference in one-factor alphas of hedge funds 
and “Other” institutions.23 However, the magnitude of the differences is small. The overall evidence 
suggests that hedge funds do not command superior returns from their long-equity positions on average.24
 
  
We will analyze the performance within the hedge fund group in more detail in the following sections.  
II. The Economics of Self-Reporting: Hypothesis Development 
 After characterizing the sample of all 13F filing hedge fund companies, the natural question to 
ask is when hedge funds choose to report to commercial hedge fund databases, or whether they ever 
choose to report at all.  Answer to this question will shed light on the systematic differences, if any, 
                                                 
21 We code the monthly return as missing if the lag between the current month and the last quarter-end when the 
portfolio information is available exceeds six months.   
22 Given that institutions as a whole hold a majority stake in public equities (the percentage increased from 32% in 
the beginning to 66% to the end of our sample period), it is not surprising that on average they simply perform at par 
with the market. 
23 Since we examine the performance of long equity portfolios of institutions, we do not need to use multifactor 
models augmented by option factors as in Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Fung and Hsieh (2001, 2004). 
24 This does not rule out the possibility that hedge funds may be delivering superior performance on their non-equity 
component of the portfolios. 
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between hedge fund information (especially returns) accessible from the commercial databases and 
information that is hidden.  Characterizing such differences is the key to understanding the selection bias 
in the databases, which has important implications for hedge fund research.   
 Like other economic activities, the reporting behavior of hedge funds is an outcome of cost-
benefit trade-offs.  The benefit that is most cited by hedge fund data vendors in marketing their services to 
hedge funds is that listing in a database enhances a fund’s exposure to potential investors, including fund 
of funds, foundations, banks, endowments, pensions, consultants, and high net worth individuals.  Such 
benefits are likely to be more significant for small- and medium-sized fund companies that desire more 
publicity but lack the resources for aggressive direct marketing.   
 The main cost of reporting is a partial loss of secrecy and privacy that some hedge funds value.  
The SEC’s efforts to push for more disclosure by hedge fund companies have faced strong resistance,25
 An additional cost is related to the clientele of database subscribers. Potential long-term investors 
targeted directly by hedge funds (mostly large institutions, fiduciaries, and some funds-of-funds) are 
different from those attracted to hedge funds through database subscription, which tend to be more “retail” 
 
indicating the industry’s general reluctance for or even strong opposition to more transparency. Though 
self-reporting hedge funds in general do not reveal holdings information to hedge fund databases, the 
reported information, such as general descriptions of style classification, asset allocation, monthly returns, 
and leverage/hedging ratios, is often revealing of the funds’ investment strategy.  For example, proposed 
“hedge fund replication” strategies that promise to provide low-cost hedge fund exposure are mostly built 
on the self-reported information (Kat and Palaro (2006)). Moreover, keeping the reporting status 
constitutes a commitment to revealing a fixed set of information at fixed time intervals. Such a rigid 
schedule reduces a hedge fund company’s flexibility in marketing, such as featuring a subset of 
information or a chosen period of return performance that is most favorable to the fund.   
                                                 
25  Such resistance culminated in Goldstein vs. Securities and Exchange Commission (details in 
http://www.seclaw.com/docs/ref/GoldsteinSEC04-1434.pdf) where Phillip Goldstein, the manager of hedge fund 
Bulldog, challenged an SEC 2004 rule that required most hedge fund advisors to register with the SEC by early 
2006.  The decision of the Court, made in June 2006, was mostly in favor of Goldstein. 
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based and shorter-term, consisting disproportionately of small institutions and individuals.  Stulz (2007) 
mentions that retail investors may require more “hand-holding” subsequent to poor performance. Mutual 
fund literature also provides some evidence on institutional money being more “sticky” than retail in that 
the former does not chase short-term performance as much as the latter (James and Karceski (2006), Chen, 
Goldstein, and Jiang (2009)).  Hedge funds usually value long-term investors whose investing or 
divesting decisions are not sensitive to short-term performance. Hence, some hedge funds may not want 
to be exposed to the clientele that are typical of database subscribers.   
 While it is understandable that funds may not desire to appear in commercial databases during 
periods of poor performance because they do not wish to publicize the embarrassment, it is much less 
clear whether reporting funds are overall better or worse performers than non-reporting ones.  On one 
hand, the extreme poor performers may be unlikely to appear in a database simply because they do not 
survive long enough to satisfy the requirement for track records by most data vendors.  On the other hand, 
some successful hedge funds may prefer to voluntarily report as it serves as a strong signal for better 
transparency and institutional quality. At the same time, the very successful funds can also shun reporting 
given their low needs for enhanced visibility and possibly full capacity.  In addition, Lhabitant (2006) 
offers one explanation to the general absence of the largest and most successful hedge funds in the 
commercial databases:  these funds might be concerned that communicating performance to a data vendor 
may lead to inclusion in that data vendor’s index, which automatically raises the performance of that 
index.  As a result, these hedge funds’ individual performance will appear less differentiated.  If these 
arguments are valid, then both the periods of self-reporting and the sample of reporting funds will be 
biased toward average performance. 
 
III. Biases Conditional on Self-Reporting:  Reporting Initiation and Termination 
 We start with the first type of selection bias concerning the subsample of self-reporting funds:  
When do fund companies initiate reporting and when do they terminate? If funds tend to choose reporting 
initiation after a run of superior performance or to terminate reporting following subpar returns, 
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examining the performance of funds while they appear in the database can contribute to a “timing bias.”  
Until now, the extant literature has not been able to quantify these two forms of timing bias as the 
performance of funds “before birth” and “after death” (with respect to the databases) is not observable 
from the commercial databases.  Since our return analysis is based on 13F filings, which are not 
constrained by funds’ reporting status to the commercial databases, it allows us to shed light on these two 
biases, hitherto unexplored in the hedge fund literature.  
 
A. First form of timing bias:  Comparison of fund companies before and after the reporting initiation 
 The Union Hedge Fund Database provides information on the dates when the hedge funds enter 
the databases.  If a fund company reports to multiple constituent sources in the Union Database, we use 
the earliest date. Among all 13F-filing hedge fund companies, 103 out of the 366 self-reporting funds 
afford the before-after analysis if we require a minimum of 12 months of return information around the 
initial reporting date and the existence of such information on both sides of the date.  For 77 funds, there 
is accurate information on the initial reporting dates provided by one commercial database.  For rest of the 
funds, such exact information is not available and all we can observe is the first date of the performance 
data recorded in the database.  Following the practice of the literature (e.g., Ackermann, McEnally, and 
Ravenscraft (1999)), for such funds we add 24 months to the first performance dates to form the 
approximate first reporting dates, effectively assuming a typical practice of 24 months’ back-filling by 
reporting funds. This assumption could be problematic as Fung and Hsieh (2009) document periods 
longer than 24 months between the inception and first reporting dates. Hence, for robustness, we conduct 
our analyses using both the entire sample and the subsample with accurate information on initial reporting 
date. We focus more on the latter results for our discussion that follows. Please note that since we already 
account for the backfilling bias in our analysis, first form of the timing bias examined here is distinct from 
the backfilling bias.  
 For each fund whose reporting date falls within the 1980-2008 period, we compare the return 
measures (imputed from the 13F holdings) during the 24-month period before reporting to the Union 
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Database and the 24-month period thereafter (or as many months as possible subject to a minimum of 12 
months in total on both sides of the reporting initiation month).  Results are reported in Table II. 
[Insert Table II here.] 
 Panel A of Table II shows that performance is overall worse after initial reporting compared to 
the period before, though the difference is not statistically significant. The difference in the average raw 
monthly return is 52 basis points, or 6 percent on an annualized basis. 
 Importantly, when we use the subsample of funds for which we have accurate initial reporting 
dates, we observe from Panel B of Table II that the performance after initial reporting is significantly 
lower than that before reporting. The average raw returns and measures of risk-adjusted performance 
(excess returns, CAPM alpha, and four-factor alpha) are lower by 90, 73, 58, and 24 basis points per 
month respectively, and all except four-factor alpha differences being statistically significant at the 1% 
level in addition to being economically meaningful. We obtain similar results using the median 
performance with the corresponding figures being 49, 32, 33, and 19 basis points per month respectively. 
Finally, a difference-in-difference approach, which computes the difference around the initial reporting 
date between raw returns of reporting and non-reporting hedge funds also indicate significant 
deterioration using both the median and mean values. 
The results in Panel B are much more significant and coherent, compared to the full-sample 
results in Panel A, albeit with a smaller sample, indicating that accurate reporting dates are essential to 
identify the selection bias around reporting initiation for the sample of self-reporting funds, providing 
support to the arguments in Fung and Hsieh (2009).   
 The interpretation of this difference is further facilitated by Figure 3.  Panels A and B plot the 
time series of the monthly raw returns and excess returns averaged across the 77 hedge funds (with 
accurate initial self-reporting dates) from 24 months before the reporting month, to 24 months afterwards.  
The two dotted horizontal lines marked the time-series averages of the two sub-periods.  The figure 
indicates that funds choose to initiate self-reporting after a run of superior performance, but such 
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performance does not persist in that it mean-reverts to levels at par with the market after reporting 
initiation.   
[Insert Figure 3 here.] 
 The subsequent normal performance after a run of superior one supports the hypothesis of 
strategic timing in initiating self-reporting by hedge funds, if they decide to report at some time. Given 
the customary back-filling practice (that is, hedge funds usually send retrospective return data to 
commercial databases), our analysis shows that the early periods of reported returns contain an upward 
bias for inferring the reported funds’ normal performance.  Hence, the trimming of early-period returns in 
return analysis as adopted by the literature is justified.  However, the different results between Panels A 
and B of Table II also points to the limitation of the simple 24-month trimming practice as it does not 
seem to identify the true initial reporting dates, and hence does not completely clear the first type of 
timing bias in reporting initiation.   
B. Hazard Analysis for reporting initiation 
To relate the timing bias to other time-varying fund characteristics in addition to return 
performance, we present the hazard analysis of reporting initiation for the subsample of fund companies 
with accurate initial reporting date information. In the language of hazard analysis, in our case, the 
“failure” event is the hedge fund’s first appearance in the hedge fund Union Database. Thus, the hazard 
rate ℎ(𝑡) is the hedge fund’s probability of reporting initiation in a given period t, conditional on the fact 
that it did not initiate reporting in any of the previous periods.  We start with a time-varying sample of 
non-reporting funds.  Once a hedge fund has initiated reporting, it exits the sample because the spell has 
“failed”. We estimate our instantaneous hazard model with respect to a set of time-varying explanatory 
variables (X), such as fund characteristics. That is, the values of these variables are tracked dynamically 
since the fund’s first appearance in the Thomson Reuters database until its first reporting date to the 
Union Hedge Fund Database (observations of completed spells) or to the end of our sample period 
(observations of censored spells). 
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We adopt the semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model (Cox (1972)) which estimates the 
relation between the instantaneous hazard rates and the covariates by maximizing a partial-likelihood 
function. In this model, the hazard rate is assumed to be: 
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ(0)𝑒𝑋𝑡′𝛽      (1) 
where t is the number of periods since the fund company’s first appearance in the Thomson Reuters 
database. In this setting, a positive coefficient 𝛽𝑘  indicates that an increase in the covariate Xk is 
associated with an increase in the instantaneous probability of hedge funds’ initiating reporting to a 
database during period t.  We conduct the analysis at the quarterly frequency and results are reported in 
Table III. Following the norm adopted in hazard analyses and to facilitate interpretation, Table III reports 
the hazard ratio (also called “exponentiated coefficient”) associated with each covariate rather than the 
raw coefficients βk where the ratio is defined as: '( | 1, ) / ( | ) kk k k kh t X X X h t X e
β
−= + = . A hazard ratio that 
is greater (smaller) than unit indicates a positive (negative) contribution of the covariate to the 
instantaneous probability of reporting initiation.  The z-statistics in the table testifies the significance of 
raw coefficient (βk) being different from zero, or of the hazard ratio ( keβ ) being different from unit. 
[Insert Table III here] 
According to Table III, hedge funds after better performing periods have higher probability of 
reporting initiation during the current period: hazard ratios associated with performance (lagged) are 
significantly higher than one. This result supports evidence in Figure 3: hedge fund’s performance tends 
to be abnormally high before reporting initiation. When risk-adjusted measures of performance are 
considered (columns (2)-(4) in Table III) and market returns are controlled for, the evidence suggests that 
hedge funds have higher probability of reporting initiation after a period of good market performance. 
This result is consistent with the ease in marketing funds when overall market performs well. The 
coefficient of the market return is insignificant when performance is measured by raw returns because the 
latter already contains information about market returns.  
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Table III highlights additional elements in hedge funds’ strategic timing in reporting initiation.  
First, when the proxy for the aggregate flow to hedge fund industry is high, hedge funds have 
significantly lower probability of reporting initiation. Here we approximate the aggregate flow by the 
total increase in the equity portfolio value of all 13F-filing hedge funds, netting out the increase due to 
stock price appreciation.  This evidence suggests that a boom in the hedge fund industry provides enough 
capital to many funds, leading to their lowered needs to enhance exposure to potential investors by 
reporting initiation.  
Second, hedge funds are less likely to initiate reporting during periods of higher portfolio return 
volatility. Prior literature shows that flows to hedge funds and mutual funds are dampened by return 
volatility conditional on performance (Ding, Getmansky, Liang, and Wermers (2009), Huang, Wei, and 
Yan (2007)), indicating that investors tend to discount fund returns when the volatility is also high. 
Moreover, the Sharpe Ratio is a common performance measure adopted by commercial databases, and 
this metric is unfavorable to funds with volatile returns. As a result, funds are reluctant to publicize 
themselves to commercial databases when their returns are volatile. 
Finally, hedge funds have higher probability of reporting initiation in their youth stage if they 
decide to report: the hazard ratios associated with fund age are significantly lower than one. This result is 
expected as young funds are the most likely to benefit from reporting initiation. The impact of the 
portfolio concentration (as measured by the average portfolio Herfindahl index) on the reporting initiation 
is negative and significant at the 10% level. Thus, hedge funds operating more concentrated portfolios are 
less likely to initiate reporting. This is consistent with the costs of revealing trading secrecy when funds 
report to databases, an issue that we will discuss in more detail in Section IV. 
C. Second form of timing bias:  Comparison of fund companies before and after reporting termination 
 There are 187 funds in our sample that terminated reporting to the Union Database at some point 
during the 1980-2007 period.  For these funds, we are able to analyze the determinants of reporting 
termination using the same method as we used in Table II for reporting initiation.  Moreover, for these 
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funds we have more information about their termination decision due to their reporting status when the 
decision is made.  Results are reported in Table IV.  
[Insert Table IV here.] 
 We observe that the performance after termination of reporting is significantly lower than that 
before termination. This is not surprising given that most funds exit from commercial databases when 
their performance starts deteriorating (Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999), Liang (2000), and 
Fung and Hsieh (2000, 2002) among others). What is interesting and unique about our analysis here is 
that we are able to determine the performance of funds after they disappear from the commercial 
databases. Our analysis is thus analogous to computing the delisting returns for stocks in Shumway (1997) 
and Shumway and Warther (1999), hence this second form of the timing bias is analogous to a “delisting 
bias.”  
Table IV shows that the average monthly raw returns and the three measures of risk-adjusted 
performance: excess returns, CAPM alpha, and four-factor alpha, are lower by 1.9%, 0.3%, 0.1%, and 0.2% 
on a monthly basis after the termination of reporting (the first two being significant at the 1% and 5% 
levels).26
 About 64% of the funds (119 funds) that terminate reporting in our sample provide reasons for 
termination to the commercial databases.  In 112 out of the 119 cases, the given reasons indicate distress 
(such as liquidation, fund being dormant or data vendor being unable to contact the fund).  Other given 
reasons could be positive (such as being closed to new investors) or unclear (such as being merged to 
another fund) but such cases are rare.  When we focus on the subsamples partitioned by stated reasons, we 
 We obtain similar results for median performance differences with the corresponding figures 
being 1.5%, 0.2%, 0.03%, and 0.2% per month, with the first and last differences being significant at the 
1% level. A graphical illustration of the performance around the reporting termination date is provided in 
Panels C and D of Figure 3.  The message is also similar to what is conveyed by the table.   
                                                 
26 The magnitude of excess returns is qualitatively similar to but compares favorably with Hodder, Jackwerth, and 
Kolokolova’s (2008) finding that the average delisted hedge fund held by a sample of fund of hedge funds had a 
monthly return of -1.86% immediately after it is delisted. 
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do not find significant differences across the subsamples in the changes in performance after reporting 
termination, mostly due to the much reduced sample sizes.  
 In summary, exiting from commercial databases by the reporting funds is overall a sign of 
deterioration. Interestingly, negative market returns also contribute to higher incidences of report 
termination—manifested by the higher before-after return gap in raw returns than benchmark-adjusted 
returns as shown in Table IV.  These findings about hedge fund reporting termination are consistent with 
the patterns associated with stock delisting but with a much milder magnitude, reflecting the fact that 
fundamental failure is a less dominant reason for hedge fund report termination than for stock delisting.  
Finally, the combination of good performance prior to reporting initiation (results in the previous section) 
and poor performance following reporting termination act as offsetting forces that bias the performance 
tracked by the commercial database toward average. 
 
D. Effects of Self-Reporting on Hedge Fund Flows 
D1. Reporting initiation 
 We discussed in Section II and hypothesize that a primary benefit of reporting to hedge fund 
databases is enhancing a hedge fund company’s exposure to potential clients.  If such a motive is justified, 
then a hedge fund should experience, on average, an increase in flows after the initiation of reporting 
compared to the counterfactual of not reporting.  For all funds that initiate reporting during our sample 
period, we can isolate the quarterly observations from four quarters before the initial reporting date to 
four quarters afterwards.  We then conduct the following regression at the fund (indexed by i)-quarter 
(indexed by t) level: 
 
4
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i t j t j t t i t i t
j
Flow D Performance Controlλ β γ ε− − −
=−
= + + +∑  (2) 
In (2), Flowi,t is calculated as (Sizei,t – Reti,t*Sizei,t-1) /Sizei,t-1, all using disclosed holdings in Form 13F.  It 
measures the change in the value of a fund’s equity portfolio due to changes in investment by the funds’ 
investors (and not due to the changes in the stock prices), and is a proxy for the net fund flows. The all-
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sample average (median) percentage flow to hedge funds companies is 3.6% (1.4%).  t jD −  are the 
dummy variables for four quarters before and after the initial reporting date. Performancet-3:t is the 
monthly average of the performance measure during the past four quarters that end in the current quarter, 
and Controli,t-1 are lagged control variables including portfolio size (in log), fund age (numbers of quarters 
since first appearance on Thomson Reuters, in log), portfolio turnover rates, and portfolio volatility.  
Based on the lessons learnt from Table II (discussed in Section III.A), we focus on the subsample of funds 
with accurate initial reporting dates only.  Results are reported in Panel A of Table V. 
[Insert Table V here.] 
 The three columns in Table V Panel A estimate equation (2) using three benchmark-adjusted 
return performance measures:  return in excess of the market, CAPM one-factor alpha, and four-factor 
alpha.  The coefficients on Performance tell us that flows are highly responsive (significant at the 1% 
level) to risk-adjusted returns, regardless of whether we use a simple market benchmark (return in excess 
of the market) or alphas from one-factor or four-factor models.  Our findings are economically significant 
too. For example, for a one percentage point increase in monthly return in excess of the market (or 12 
percentage points during the four quarters when performance is measured), net flows to a fund increase 
by 2.5% of the total portfolio value (see column 1 of Table V Panel A).  This flow pattern is similar to 
what the literature has documented for mutual funds (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano 
(1998)).   
 Table V shows a small increase in flows during quarters t+1 and t+2 using four-factor alphas, 
where t is the initial reporting quarter. However, this increase is transient and does not persist into future 
quarters, possibly due to a deterioration in performance after reporting initiation, as we show earlier in our 








− =∑ ∑  , we are unable to reject the null of equality. Therefore, reporting to databases does not 
lead to higher flows over a longer window comparing flows during the year following initiation to those 
during the year preceding reporting initiation.  
108 
 
It is worth pointing out that we do not observe the counterfactuals—flows that would prevail had 
the reporting funds chosen not to initiate reporting. It is possible that funds anticipating loss of flows from 
existing sources would choose to report to databases, and such a decision process biases down the 
estimate for the incremental flows from exposure through the databases.   
D2. Reporting Termination 
 Lastly, we repeat the analysis used in regression (2) on reporting termination. Results reported in 
Panel B of Table V show that funds encounter significantly lower net flows (or more outflows) after 








− =∑ ∑ is strongly rejected (at the 1% level) in favor of a 
negative change in net flows across all regression specifications. More specifically, the cumulative net 
outflows during the quarter of reporting termination and four quarters afterwards amount to 29-34 percent 
of the lagged portfolio size.  This evidence adds further support to a negative delisting bias, i.e., delisting 
from hedge fund databases is in general a sign of deterioration.   
 
IV. The Unconditional Self-Reporting Bias:  Comparing Self-Reporting and Non-Reporting Hedge 
Funds 
 As a next step, we move up from the subsample of self-reporting funds to the full sample and ask 
the question “who report.” Our answer relies on the comparison of the pooled sample of 13F-filing hedge 
fund companies that never appear in the Union Database (there are 554 such non-reporting companies) 
and those that appear in the database for some time during our sample period (there are 366 such self-
reporting companies).  To reduce noise, we do not include the 279 fund companies whose reporting status 
cannot be accurately verified.  
A. Comparison of fund characteristics 
Table VI reports the comparison of fund companies and portfolio characteristics:  portfolio size, 
portfolio concentration, returns volatility, portfolio turnover rate, and fund company inception year. 
[Insert Table VI here.] 
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 In Panel A, we compare the characteristics of never-reporting funds with those of ever-reporting 
ones using information from all time periods as available on the Thomson Reuters.  Panel A of Table VI 
reveals several patterns regarding the all-time characteristics of self-reporting funds.  First, the portfolio 
size of self-reporting hedge funds are more or less comparable to the non-reporting ones, though the latter 
has much higher standard deviation.  The self-reporting funds are slightly smaller by the mean statistic 
but somewhat larger by median comparison, indicating that the largest fund companies are under-
represented in the set of self-reporting funds. This finding is intuitive as the larger funds are more likely 
to be the successful ones that are possibly facing decreasing returns to scale and capacity constraints. 
Such funds may have weaker incentives to report to commercial databases for attracting more capital.   
Second, the self-reporting hedge funds have lower portfolio concentration than that of the non-
reporting funds as measured by the average portfolio Herfindahl index (average of 0.08 versus 0.11, 
significant at 1% level).  The average monthly return volatilities of the two categories are almost identical, 
but the self-reporting funds have considerably higher portfolio annualized turnover rates (106%) than that 
of the non-reporting funds (79%) and the difference is significant at the 1% level.  Again these findings 
conform to the economics of reporting as less concentrated (or more diversified) and higher turnover 
funds need to worry less about their trading strategies being revealed through self-reporting. Finally, the 
average inception year (defined as a fund company’s first appearance in the Thomson Reuters database) is 
very similar for both groups, though the median self-reporting fund is two years younger than its non-
reporting counterpart.   
 Table VI Panel A further compares the loadings on common risk factors for self-reporting and 
non-reporting funds.  Interestingly, the equity positions of self-reporting funds have significantly higher 
exposure to the size (SMB) and book-to-market (HML) factors where the differences in both mean and 
median are significant at the 1% level.  The difference in the loadings on the market factor follows the 
same pattern using the median statistic only, and the difference in the loadings on the momentum factor is 
not significant.  To the extent that exposure to common risk factors hardly constitutes trading secrecy, 
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these results support the hypothesis that fund with less conventional trading strategies (i.e., lower factor 
loadings) are more reluctant to reveal their information to databases. 
The two pooled samples compared in Panel A of Table VI are not necessarily directly comparable 
in that self-reporting and non-reporting fund companies may exist in the Thomson database for different 
periods and different lengths of time.  To refine the comparison, we make the following adjustments:  For 
each self-reporting fund, we crop out the period for which it appears in the Thomson Reuters Ownership 
database (which may contain periods before, during, and after its reporting to the Union Database). We 
then find non-reporting fund companies that have 13F data over the same period (or with the maximum 
overlap).  If there are ties in matches, we choose the one that is closest in portfolio size as the self-
reporting fund to be the “matching fund.”   Panel B of Table VI reports the results from such refined 
comparison. 
 The comparisons between the two groups regarding the differences in mean and median of 
turnover rates in Panel B are qualitatively similar to those shown in Panel A, but the magnitudes of the 
differences are strengthened.  Moreover, the differences in the median portfolio concentration are now 
positive and significant. The portfolio sizes of the paired funds are almost identical, only due to the 
matching algorithm that is based on this variable.  Finally, the matching non-reporting funds are now 
much older, which is again an artifact of the algorithm which favors matching funds with longer periods 
of 13F filings. 
Please note that the pair-wise comparison analyses reported in Table VI and the hazard analysis 
(reported in Table III) do not necessarily yield coefficients of the same sign or of similar significance 
levels.  While the former relates the fund characteristics (averaged over the time series) to their propensity 
to ever report, the latter focuses on how the time-variation in fund characteristics prompt report initiation 
at certain point of time.  For example, the hazard analysis indicates that funds are less likely to initiate 
reporting during the period of volatile returns; but reporting funds as a whole do not have less return 




B. Comparison of return performance 
We next move on to return performance comparison, which underlies the important consequences 
of the self-reporting-related biases in commercial databases.  Such results are reported in Table VII, 
where Panels A and B adopt the same classification schemes as in the Panels A and B of Table VI.   
[Insert Table VII here.] 
We observe from Panel A (which uses all-time information as available on Thomson Reuters) 
that average (median) raw returns of self-reporting funds are significantly higher, at the 1% (5%) level, 
than those of the non-reporting funds. However, both the magnitude and significance of the differences 
drop precipitously when the returns are adjusted by the market benchmark (i.e., return in excess of the 
market), or by the CAPM one-factor or using the four factors (market, size, book-to-market, and 
momentum) first used in Carhart (1997). 
 The return differences between the mean and median return measures over the matched time 
period, reported in Table VII Panel B, indicate that self-reporting funds underperform non-reporting funds 
by 2-8 basis points monthly using the various performance measures, but none of the differences are 
statistically significant.  Interestingly, the differences by percentile values indicate that for lower 
percentiles (e.g., the 5th percentile), self-reporting funds perform significantly worse (at the 5% and 10% 
levels) using two of the three benchmark-adjusted return measures, while the pattern does not hold at 
percentiles above median. Combined evidence indicates that a small fraction of reporting funds has poor 
performance and may be struggling; while the most successful ones are no more prone to self-reporting. 
 The only conflicting difference between the results from Panel A and those from Panel B is the 
relative ranking of raw performance between the two groups of funds:  it is significantly positive in favor 
of the self-reporting funds in the former while negative (but short of significance) in the latter. But such 
an inconsistency is not observed using any of the benchmark-adjusted returns.  Taken together, these 
figures indicate timing of hedge fund reporting based on the market condition:  hedge funds that were 
active during years when the overall market performed well were more likely to report to hedge fund 
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databases.  This evidence of timing based on market information complements the analysis in Section III 
regarding timing on individual fund performance. 
 The overall evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that young and medium-sized fund 
companies have a stronger incentive to report to databases to publicize their funds and attract potential 
investors.  Moreover, self-reporting funds are more diversified, employ higher-frequency trading 
strategies (using portfolio Herfindahl index and turnover rates as proxies), and have higher loadings on 
common factors—presumably trading secrecy is less likely to be revealed through voluntary disclosure or 
is less important when portfolio involves more stocks, evolves more quickly, and have more exposure to 
common risk factors.  This pattern echoes Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, and Yang’s (2010) finding that hedge 
funds adopting less conventional investment strategies are more likely to resort to confidential 13F filing 
in order to delay revealing their quarter-end positions.  In both cases, funds who value privacy more are 
more likely to refrain from voluntary disclosures or to seek exemptions from mandatory ones.   
 Finally, the difference in the return performance, though slightly in favor of the non-reporting 
funds, is small.27
 
  This is good news for the existing and ongoing studies on hedge fund performance 
because the self-reporting bias may not have a material impact when it comes to performance evaluation.  
In Section II, we hypothesize that the sample of self-reporting funds might be over-represented by funds 
with average performance.  Therefore the selection bias due to self-reporting could be offset by the 
absence of both the most and least successful funds.  Fung and Hsieh (2000) conjectured, with the support 
of some anecdotal evidence, that the selection bias due to self-reporting is limited because on the one 
hand “only funds with good performance want to be included in a database,” while on the other hand 
“managers with superior performance did not necessarily participate in vendors’ databases.”  Our results 
are supportive of their conjecture. 
                                                 
27 This result is consistent with Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) who find that hedge funds reporting to two 
commercial databases perform worse than the non-reporting ones among the sample of activist hedge funds, but the 
difference is not statistically significant.  Their performance measure is different in that they use the abnormal 
returns of the companies targeted by the activist funds during the event window. 
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V.  Conclusion 
 This paper presents a comprehensive study that formally analyzes the self-reporting-related biases 
in hedge fund databases. We show that a union of commercial databases largely eliminates the 
unconditional bias in performance due to offsetting effects motivating self-reporting.  This is good news 
for the expanding volume of research based on commercial hedge fund databases. Yet our analyses also 
demonstrate the desirability of merging multiple databases, the systematic differences in the 
characteristics between reporting and non-reporting funds, as well as significant forms of timing bias 
corresponding to the deterioration in performance after both reporting initiation and termination (or 
delisting) among the subsample of reporting funds. These findings can be important in certain contexts. 
For example, timing bias related to reporting initiation has implications for examining the performance of 
emerging funds and managers (Aggarwal and Jorion (2010)). 
 Relatedly, our analyses indicate non-trivial impacts of market-wide returns on fund reporting 
initiation/termination and fund flows in that both variables are more sensitive to raw returns than to risk-
adjusted returns.  Such evidence suggests that hedge funds investors chase absolute as well as excess 
returns, even though market-wide conditions cannot be attributed to skills of fund managers. As a result, 
hedge funds time their reporting or termination of reporting in response to their own performance as well 
as to the market-wide conditions.     
   Taken together, our research provides important references and benchmarks for hedge fund 
researchers and investment managers who use commercial databases and publicly available information 
on portfolio holdings of institutions. Our findings shed light on the motivation and consequences of 
voluntary disclosure by hedge funds. Finally, by comparing databases from mandatory and voluntary 
sources, our research also contributes to the ongoing debate regarding more stringent disclosure rules for 
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Venn Diagram of the Union Hedge Fund Database  
The Union Hedge Fund Database contains a sample of 11,417 hedge funds by merging the following 
databases: CISDM, Eureka, HFR, MSCI, and TASS. This figure shows the percentage of funds covered by each 








Figure 2  
Number of Hedge Funds and Average Portfolio Size  
The two solid lines (scale to the left axis) plot the number of 13F-filing hedge funds and the number of 
self-reporting hedge funds over the period 1980-2008. The two dashed lines (scale to the right axis) plot the 
average equity portfolio size of self-reporting hedge funds and non-reporting ones. The portfolio size is calculated 




























Figure 3  
Return Performance around the Initial Reporting Date and the Reporting Termination Date 
Panel A shows the time series of monthly raw return for the self-reporting hedge funds from 24 months 
before the initial reporting date to 24 months afterwards. The imputed portfolio return is constructed by 
calculating the buy-and-hold return for the month using the most recent past disclosed quarter-end holdings. Panel 
B shows the time series of monthly excess return for the self-reporting hedge funds from 24 months before the 
initial reporting date to 24 months afterwards. The excess return is the difference between the imputed portfolio 
return and the CRSP value-weighted equity market return. Panel C repeats the analyses in Panel A for the 
reporting termination date. Panel D repeats the analyses in Panel B for the reporting termination date. 
Panel A: Raw Returns around the Initial Reporting Date 
 





























Panel C: Raw Returns around the Reporting Termination Date 
 
Panel D: Excess Returns around the Reporting Termination Date 
 

































Comparison of Hedge Funds with Other Categories of 13F-Filling Institutional Investors 
The “Hedge fund” category is manually classified (see section I.A.). The “Bank/insurance” category is a 
combination of type 1 and type 2 institutions by the classification of Thomson Reuters Ownership Database for 
13F filings. The “Mutual fund” category consists of type 3 institutions by Thomson Reuters. The “Investment 
advisor” category consists of type 4 institutions by Thomson Reuters. The “Other” category includes type 5 
institutions by Thomson Reuters (with corrections for coding after 1998).  All non-hedge-fund categories exclude 
classified hedge funds. The portfolio size is calculated as the total value of quarter-end equity portfolio using 
reported shares and corresponding quarter-end stock prices reported in CRSP. The Portfolio Herfindahl index is 
the Herfindahl index of the disclosed quarter-end equity holdings. The Monthly return volatility is the volatility of 
the imputed portfolio return. The imputed portfolio return is same as defined in Figure 3. The Annualized 
portfolio turnover rate is compounded from the quarterly turnover rates, calculated as the lesser of purchases and 
sales, divided by the average portfolio size of the last and the current quarter. The Inception year is the year of the 
institution’s first appearance in Thomson Reuter (censored at 1980). The Return in excess of the market is the 
same as defined in Figure 3. One-Factor Alpha and Four-Factor Alpha are the intercepts from CAPM one-factor 
and Carhart (1997) four-factor models using all available data. Market Factor, SMB Factor, HML Factor, and 
Momentum Factor are estimated factor loadings from Carhart (1997) four-factor model. The t-statistics 
correspond to the difference between the “Hedge fund” category and other categories. The sample period is 1980-
2008. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
   Hedge fund Bank/insurance Mutual fund  Investment advisor  Other 
Portfolio size ($, million) 
Mean  1041  2609***  6305***  1809***  2431*** 
t‐statistic of the difference  −  −6.58  −5.38  −5.37  −6.76 
Median  368  600***  1036***  371  304*** 
t‐statistic of the difference  −  −5.71  −3.71  −0.13  2.97 
Portfolio Herfindahl index 
Mean  0.0953  0.0664***  0.0549***  0.0693***  0.1059* 
t−statistic of the difference  −  5.23  3.48  4.70  −1.84 
Median  0.0465  0.0285***  0.0175***  0.0277***  0.0341***
t‐statistic of the difference  −  9.51  14.19  10.77  6.72 
Monthly return volatility 
Mean  0.0553  0.0420***  0.0499***  0.0535*  0.0533* 
t‐statistic of the difference  −  14.28  3.23  1.94  1.96 
Median  0.0493  0.0406***  0.0448***  0.0466***  0.0453***
t‐statistic of the difference  −  10.02  4.35  2.99  4.02 
Annualized portfolio turnover rate 
Mean  0.9162  0.2683***  0.4901***  0.5217***  0.6026***
t‐statistic of the difference  −  29.72  13.42  18.40  13.23 
Median  0.8149  0.2313***  0.4258***  0.3948***  0.4044***
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   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
   Hedge fund Bank/insurance Mutual fund  Investment advisor  Other 
 
Inception year 
Mean  1999  1986***  1987***  1994***  2000** 
t‐statistic of the difference  −  36.56  25.04  14.07  −2.20 
Median  2002  1983***  1985***  1995***  2003* 
t‐statistic of the difference  −  25.98  23.25  16.65  −1.69 
Return in excess of the market 
Mean  0.0008  0.0005  0.0007  0.0000**  0.0001* 
t‐statistic of the difference  −  0.83  0.04  2.26  1.85 
Median  0.0011  0.0007***  0.0007**  0.0008**  0.0008* 
t‐statistic of the difference  −  2.73  2.17  2.39  1.78 
One‐Factor Alpha 
Mean  −0.0006  0.0002*  0.0016***  0.0006**  −0.0003 
t‐statistic of the difference  −  −1.66  −3.44  −2.49  −0.62 
Median  −0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0001  −0.0002 
t‐statistic of the difference  −1.42  −1.18  −0.96  0.10 
Four‐Factor Alpha 
Mean  −0.0020  0.0008***  −0.0003**  −0.0003***  0.0003***
t‐statistic of the difference  −  −6.49  −2.27  −3.87  −5.17 
Median  −0.0011  0.0004***  −0.0003**  −0.0002***  0.0000***
t‐statistic of the difference  −  −6.01  −2.36  −3.60  −4.40 
Market Factor 
Mean  1.0917  0.9573***  1.0439***  1.0418***  1.0398***
t‐statistic of the difference  −  10.59  2.71  3.96  4.03 
Median  1.0553  0.9628***  1.0309**  1.0209***  1.0014***
t‐statistic of the difference  −  10.72  2.16  3.90  5.74 
SMB Factor 
Mean  0.3344  −0.0780***  0.1600***  0.1448***  0.1267***
t‐statistic of the difference  −  22.60  5.43  10.28  11.82 
Median  0.2861  −0.1038***  0.0724***  0.0560***  0.0278***
t‐statistic of the difference  −  19.18  7.95  11.06  13.14 
HML Factor 
Mean  0.0781  −0.0356***  −0.0953***  −0.0477***  0.0344* 
t‐statistic of the difference  −  5.42  4.12  6.18  1.88 
Median  0.0706  −0.0311***  −0.0599***  −0.0275***  0.0251***
t‐statistic of the difference  −  7.18  4.29  7.71  2.98 
Momentum Factor 
Mean  −0.0126  −0.0156  −0.0044  −0.0048  −0.0087 
t‐statistic of the difference  −  0.26  −0.40  −0.64  −0.29 
Median  −0.0047  −0.0147  0.0050  −0.0084  −0.0121 





   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
   Hedge fund Bank/insurance Mutual fund  Investment advisor  Other 
 
Number of institutions 






Comparison of Return Performance before and after the Initial Reporting Date 
This table compares the return measures (defined as in Table 1) for fund companies during the 24-month 
period before the initial reporting date, and during the 24-month period afterwards. The pooled 48-month period 
is used to estimate the beta loadings for the one-factor alpha and four-factor alpha. The one-factor alpha and four-
factor alpha are coded as missing if there are fewer than 12 observations during the estimation window. The 
Difference-in-Difference is the difference around the initial reporting date between raw returns of reporting and 
non-reporting hedge funds. Panel A includes the full sample of self-reporting fund companies where the initial 
reporting dates for some companies are imputed from the first performance dates. Panel B uses only the 
subsample where such information is accurately recorded. The t-statistics for the differences between the two 
samples are reported below difference estimates in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 













5th Percentile  −0.0346  −0.0331  −0.0237  −0.0228  −0.0282 
25th Percentile  −0.0013  −0.0041  −0.0038  −0.0043  −0.0063 
Median  0.0129  0.0009  0.0018  0.0010  −0.0010 
75th Percentile  0.0211  0.0079  0.0073  0.0060  0.0044 
95th Percentile  0.0448  0.0290  0.0254  0.0199  0.0275 
Mean  0.0115  0.0036  0.0035  0.0021  0.0010 
Std. Dev.  0.0299  0.0253  0.0224  0.0175  0.0236 
# funds  103  103  102  102  103 
After initial reporting 
5th Percentile  −0.0286  −0.0184  −0.0134  −0.0135  −0.0183 
25th Percentile  0.0015  −0.0039  −0.0032  −0.0041  −0.0065 
Median  0.0084  0.0016  0.0013  0.0005  0.0001 
75th Percentile  0.0174  0.0083  0.0072  0.0055  0.0054 
95th Percentile  0.0291  0.0173  0.0164  0.0129  0.0170 
Mean  0.0063  0.0012  0.0014  0.0003  −0.0010 
Std. Dev.  0.0170  0.0118  0.0093  0.0091  0.0114 



























5th Percentile  0.0061  0.0147  0.0103  0.0093  0.0099 
[0.76]  [0.74]  [0.96]  [0.86]  [0.71] 
25th Percentile  0.0028  0.0003  0.0007  0.0002  −0.0002 
[0.18]  [0.10]  [0.26]  [−0.06]  [−0.08] 
Median  −0.0046  0.0007  −0.0005  −0.0006  0.0010 
[−1.46]  [0.71]  [−0.54]  [−0.37]  [0.57] 
75th Percentile  −0.0037*  0.0004  −0.0002  −0.0005  0.0010 
[−1.82]  [0.09]  [−0.27]  [−0.01]  [0.20] 
95th Percentile  −0.0157  −0.0118  −0.0090  −0.0070  −0.0105 
[−1.18]  [−0.91]  [−0.85]  [−0.91]  [−1.02] 
Mean  −0.0052  −0.0024  −0.0021  −0.0018  −0.0021 




Panel B:  Subsample of Fund Companies with Accurate Initial Reporting Date Information 
 













5th Percentile  −0.0147  −0.0094  −0.0116  −0.0099  −0.0116 
25th Percentile  0.0075  −0.0006  −0.0013  −0.0030  −0.0040 
Median  0.0161  0.0033  0.0018  0.0011  0.0012 
75th Percentile  0.0238  0.0094  0.0077  0.0048  0.0057 
95th Percentile  0.0454  0.0394  0.0255  0.0136  0.0317 
Mean  0.0160  0.0059  0.0034  0.0007  0.0024 
Std. Dev.  0.0176  0.0141  0.0114  0.0089  0.0118 
# funds  77  77  76  76  76 
After initial reporting 
5th Percentile  −0.0333  −0.0226  −0.0236  −0.0159  −0.0257 
25th Percentile  0.0029  −0.0041  −0.0053  −0.0046  −0.0062 
Median  0.0112  0.0001  −0.0014  −0.0008  −0.0014 
75th Percentile  0.0174  0.0056  0.0047  0.0035  0.0036 
95th Percentile  0.0271  0.0147  0.0119  0.0102  0.0106 
Mean  0.0070  −0.0014  −0.0024  −0.0017  −0.0033 
Std. Dev.  0.0185  0.0132  0.0135  0.0119  0.0130 
# funds  76  76  76  76  76 
Differences (t‐statistics) 
5th Percentile  −0.0186  −0.0133  −0.0120  −0.0060  −0.0141 
[−1.31]  [−1.21]  [−1.06]  [−0.35]  [−1.27] 
25th Percentile  −0.0046  −0.0035**  −0.0040**  −0.0016  −0.0022 
[−1.02]  [−2.36]  [−2.55]  [−1.21]  [−1.20] 
Median  −0.0049***  −0.0032**  −0.0033**  −0.0019  −0.0026* 
[−2.88]  [−2.36]  [−2.51]  [−1.33]  [−1.97] 
75th Percentile  −0.0064***  −0.0039  −0.0030  −0.0013  −0.0021 
[−3.34]  [−1.56]  [−1.27]  [−1.19]  [−1.36] 
95th Percentile  −0.0184*  −0.0248**  −0.0135*  −0.0034  −0.0211** 
[−1.99]  [−2.51]  [−1.74]  [−0.74]  [−2.04] 
Mean  −0.0090***  −0.0073***  −0.0058***  −0.0024  −0.0057*** 








Hazard Analysis of the Reporting Initiation  
This table presents the hazard analysis of reporting initiation for the subsample of fund companies with 
accurate initial reporting date information using the Cox proportional hazard model. Performance, Flow, 
Aggregate Flow to Hedge Fund Industry, and Market Return are calculated over [−1, 0] quarters relative to the 
quarter of reporting initiation. Portfolio size (in log), Turnover, and Return volatility are as defined in Table 1. 
Manager age (in log) is the number of years since the fund company’s first appearance in Thomson Reuters. Flow 
is defined as the change in total portfolio value during the current quarter net of the asset value 
appreciation/depreciation due to returns, scaled by the portfolio value at the end of the previous quarter. Reported 
coefficients are hazard ratios which are greater (smaller) than unit when the original coefficients are positive 
(negative). The z-statistics are calculated using the original coefficients (not hazard ratios) and are reported below 
coefficient estimates in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level respectively. 
 









              
Performance  228.13***  190.80***  83.09***  40.60** 
[2.90]   [2.76]  [3.12]  [2.01] 
Aggregate Flow to Hedge Fund Industry  0.2509***  0.2517***  0.2619***  0.2659*** 
[−4.84]  [−4.85]  [−4.67]  [−4.68] 
Portfolio volatility (%)  0.8245***  0.8242***  0.8287***  0.8342*** 
[−6.05]  [−6.05]  [−5.89]  [−5.70] 
Manager age (log)  0.9243***  0.9238***  0.9236***  0.9216*** 
[−3.17]  [−3.19]  [−3.19]  [−3.28] 
Portfolio Herfindahl Index  0.1280*  0.1307*  0.1200*  0.1331* 
[−1.74]   [−1.73]  [−1.83]  [−1.78] 
Portfolio size (log)  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
[0.62]  [0.63]  [0.72]  [0.66] 
Turnover  0.6650  0.6623  0.6723  0.6975 
[−1.17]  [−1.18]  [−1.14]  [−1.05] 
Flow  0.8962  0.8959  0.9183  0.9230 
[−1.14]  [−1.13]  [−0.93]  [−0.90] 
Market Return  2.16  475.4**  257.0**  233.0** 
[0.27]  [2.52]  [2.25]  [2.26] 






Comparison of Return Performance before and after Reporting Termination 
This table presents the same analyses as in Table 2 except replacing the event with reporting termination. 
The t-statistics are reported below coefficient estimates in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * 
are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 










5th Percentile  ‐0.0148  ‐0.0143  ‐0.0148  ‐0.0115  ‐0.0163 
25th Percentile  0.0081  ‐0.0009  ‐0.0027  ‐0.0024  ‐0.0033 
Median  0.0133  0.0032  0.0016  0.0019  0.0004 
75th Percentile  0.0183  0.0078  0.0069  0.0058  0.0051 
95th Percentile  0.0289  0.0178  0.0173  0.0152  0.0132 
Mean  0.0117  0.0027  0.0017  0.0015  0.0000 
Std. Dev.  0.0132  0.0102  0.0102  0.0092  0.0095 
# funds  182  182  182  182  182 
After reporting termination 
5th Percentile  ‐0.0567  ‐0.0294  ‐0.0224  ‐0.0191  ‐0.0264 
25th Percentile  ‐0.0270  ‐0.0047  ‐0.0040  ‐0.0033  ‐0.0036 
Median  ‐0.0020  0.0015  0.0013  0.0002  0.0006 
75th Percentile  0.0122  0.0060  0.0065  0.0046  0.0061 
95th Percentile  0.0302  0.0183  0.0178  0.0148  0.0215 
Mean  ‐0.0070  0.0000  0.0006  0.0000  0.0003 
Std. Dev.  0.0263  0.0148  0.0139  0.0120  0.0142 
# funds  182  182  182  182  182 
Differences (t‐statistics) 
5th Percentile  ‐0.0419  ‐0.0151  ‐0.0076  ‐0.0076  ‐0.0101 
‐3.84  ‐1.64  ‐1.01  ‐1.24  ‐1.33 
25th Percentile  ‐0.0351  ‐0.0038  ‐0.0013  ‐0.0009  ‐0.0003 
‐11.32  ‐3.11  ‐1.30  ‐0.64  ‐0.39 
Median  ‐0.0153  ‐0.0018  ‐0.0003  ‐0.0017  0.0003 
‐4.64  ‐1.73  ‐0.78  ‐2.57  0.26 
75th Percentile  ‐0.0061  ‐0.0018  ‐0.0004  ‐0.0012  0.0010 
‐3.59  ‐1.69  ‐0.38  ‐0.94  0.97 
95th Percentile  0.0013  0.0005  0.0005  ‐0.0003  0.0082 
0.20  0.49  0.44  0.08  1.62 
Mean  ‐0.0188  ‐0.0027  ‐0.0011  ‐0.0015  0.0003 






Flow to Fund Companies before and after the Initial Reporting Date 
This table reports the results of multivariate regressions that examine the flow to fund companies before 
and after the initial reporting date. The dependent variable is the net percentage flow to a fund company in a 
given quarter, where the flow is defined as the change in total portfolio value during the current quarter net of the 
asset value appreciation/depreciation due to returns, scaled by the portfolio value at the end of the previous 
quarter.  Panel A reports the estimates of equation (1) for the subsample of fund companies with accurate initial 
reporting date information using three benchmark-adjusted Performance measures: return in excess of the market, 
CAPM one-factor alpha, and Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha. Q+j, where j=-4,…, 4, is the dummy variable for j 
quarters relative to the quarter of initial reporting. Portfolio size (in log), Turnover, and Return volatility are as 
defined in Table 1. Manager age (in log) is the number of years since the fund company’s first appearance in 
Thomson Reuters. All covariates lag the dependent variable by one quarter. The F-test reported at the bottom of 
the table test the null hypothesis that sum of coefficients on Q to Q+4 and the sum of coefficients of Q-4 to Q-1 
are equal.  The F-test reported at the bottom of the table tests the null hypothesis that sum of coefficients on Q to 
Q+4 and the sum of coefficients of Q-4 to Q-1 are equal.  Panel B presents the same analyses as in Panel A for 
the full sample except examining the flows to fund companies before and after reporting termination. The t-
statistics are reported below coefficient estimates in parentheses. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
Panel A:  Effects of Reporting Initiation on Flows 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Performance Measure  Return in excess of the market  One‐factor alpha  Four‐factor alpha 
Q‐4  0.0854  0.0960  0.1062 
[1.20]  [1.34]  [1.43] 
Q‐3  −0.0083  0.0033  −0.0526* 
[−0.17]  [0.07]  [−1.71] 
Q‐2  0.0650  0.0733  0.0209 
[1.16]  [1.29]  [0.48] 
Q‐1  0.0280  0.0345  0.0363 
[0.51]  [0.63]  [0.61] 
Q  0.0387  0.0470  0.0273 
[0.97]  [1.17]  [0.69] 
Q+1  0.1282  0.1345  0.1798** 
[1.56]  [1.64]  [2.08] 
Q+2  0.0601  0.0683  0.0760* 
[1.40]  [1.60]  [1.75] 
Q+3  −0.0034  0.0026  0.0047 
[−0.06]  [0.04]  [0.08] 
Q+4  0.0504  0.0515  0.0522 
[0.65]  [0.66]  [0.67] 





   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Performance Measure  Return in excess of the market  One‐factor alpha  Four‐factor alpha 
 
 
Portfolio size  −0.0281***  −0.0273***  −0.0256*** 
[−31.00]  [−30.10]  [−27.94] 
Manager age  −0.0077***  −0.0082***  −0.0029 
[−4.69]  [−4.99]  [−1.59] 
Turnover  0.0098***  0.0114***  0.0119*** 
[3.10]  [3.64]  [3.63] 
Portfolio volatility  0.3101***  0.2984***  0.3904*** 
[5.23]  [5.03]  [6.27] 
Non‐Reporting Funds Dummy  −0.0042  −0.0026  −0.0018 
[−0.56]  [−0.34]  [−0.23] 
Constant  0.2647***  0.2613***  0.2322*** 
[25.61]  [25.21]  [21.94] 
N  141090  141089  131544 
R‐squared  0.016  0.014  0.012 
F‐test 
Point estimate  0.1002  0.1000  0.1435 
F‐statistics  1.04  1.04  1.85 





Panel B:  Effects of Reporting Termination on Flows 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Performance measure  Return in excess of the market  One‐factor alpha  Four‐factor alpha 
Q‐4  −0.0106  −0.0063  −0.0354 
[−0.30]  [−0.18]  [−1.20] 
Q‐3  0.0136  0.0163  0.0268 
[0.34]  [0.41]  [0.65] 
Q‐2  −0.0079  −0.0055  −0.0236 
[−0.34]  [−0.23]  [−1.07] 
Q‐1  0.0475  0.0526  0.0520 
[1.05]  [1.16]  [1.17] 
Q  −0.0568  −0.0584  −0.0654* 
[−1.52]  [−1.57]  [−1.73] 
Q+1  −0.0418  −0.0427  −0.0354 
[−1.00]  [−1.02]  [−0.84] 
Q+2  −0.0508  −0.0522  −0.0470 
[−1.41]  [−1.44]  [−1.29] 
Q+3  −0.0272  −0.0286  −0.0256 
[−0.69]  [−0.73]  [−0.65] 
Q+4  −0.1030***  −0.1050***  −0.1003*** 
[−2.78]  [−2.82]  [−2.71] 
Performance  2.9684***  1.4168***  1.4327*** 
[5.66]  [3.60]  [2.89] 
Portfolio size  −0.0602***  −0.0587***  −0.0567*** 
[−9.30]  [−9.13]  [−8.84] 
Manager age  −0.0160*  −0.0188**  −0.0114 
[−1.80]  [−2.11]  [−1.20] 
Annualized portfolio turnover rate  0.0026  0.0031  0.0036 
[0.24]  [0.28]  [0.32] 
Portfolio volatility  −0.0131  −0.0453  0.0454 
[−0.05]  [−0.19]  [0.18] 
Constant  0.5052***  0.5092***  0.4770*** 
[11.45]  [11.59]  [10.68] 
N  6301  6301  5934 







   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Performance measure  Return in excess of the market  One‐factor alpha  Four‐factor alpha 
F‐test 
Point estimate  −0.3222  −0.3440  −0.2935 
F‐statistics  8.48  9.56  7.03 








Comparison of Self-Reporting and Non-Reporting Fund Companies 
Panel A shows the characteristics of the self-reporting and the non-reporting fund companies. The sample 
of self-reporting fund companies includes all 13F-filing hedge fund companies that report to the Union Hedge 
Fund Database (as defined in Figure 1) for some period of time. The sample of non-reporting fund companies 
includes all 13F-filing hedge fund companies that never report to the Union Hedge Fund Database. The Portfolio 
size, the Portfolio Herfindahl index, the Monthly return volatility, the Annualized portfolio turnover rate, the 
Inception year, and the factor loadings are the same as defined in Table 1. The t-statistics correspond to the 
difference between the self-reporting fund companies and the non-reporting fund companies. The sample period 
is 1980-2008. Panel B repeats the analyses in Panel A except using a sample of non-reporting fund companies 
that is matched with the sample of reporting fund companies through the following procedure: For each self-
reporting fund, we crop out the period for which it appears in the Thomson Reuters 13F database. We then find 
non-reporting fund companies that have 13F data over the same period (or with the maximum overlap). If there 
are ties in matches, we choose the one that is closest in portfolio size as the self-reporting fund to be the 
“matching fund.” Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively. 
 
Panel A:  Comparison of Fund Characteristics 
 







Mean  927  1029  −102  −0.76 
Median  415  341  74**  2.12 
Std. Dev.  1517  2394  −877**  −2.34 
Portfolio Herfindahl index 
Mean  0.0798  0.1056  −0.0258***  −3.24 
Median  0.0458  0.0480  −0.0022  −0.50 
Std. Dev.  0.0922  0.1547  −0.0625***  −4.27 
Monthly return volatility 
Mean  0.0557  0.0556  0.0002  0.11 
Median  0.0509  0.0474  0.0036**  2.40 
Std. Dev.  0.0213  0.0295  −0.0081***  −3.25 
Annualized portfolio turnover rate 
Mean  1.0562  0.7937  0.2626***  7.19 
Median  0.9909  0.6243  0.3666***  5.72 
Std. Dev.  0.5526  0.5946  −0.0420**  −2.03 
Inception year 
Mean  1998.7  1999.0  −0.3  −0.60 
Median  2000  2002  −2.0**  −2.48 
Std. Dev.  6.6  7.8  −1.2***  −3.08 
Market Factor 
Mean  1.0940  1.0900  0.0040  0.18 
Median  1.0787  1.0373  0.0414***  2.69 












Mean  0.3863  0.2980  0.0883**  2.56 
Median  0.3416  0.2383  0.1033***  3.63 
Std. Dev.  0.3912  0.5335  −0.1423***  −3.95 
HML Factor 
Mean  0.1284  0.0428  0.0855***  2.60 
Median  0.1140  0.0407  0.0733***  3.05 
Std. Dev.  0.4333  0.5821  −0.1489***  −3.81 
Momentum Factor 
Mean  −0.0083  −0.0156  0.0074  0.34 
Median  −0.0019  −0.0059  0.0039  0.30 
Std. Dev.  0.2740  0.3366  −0.0626*  −1.94 
Number of institutions 





Panel B:  Comparison of Fund Characteristics – Matched Sample 
 







Mean  927  846  81  0.84 
Median  415  394  21  0.49 
Std. Dev.  1517  1133  384**  2.09 
Portfolio Herfindahl Index 
Mean  0.0798  0.0709  0.0089  1.41 
Median  0.0458  0.0377  0.0082***  2.88 
Std. Dev.  0.0922  0.0926  −0.0004  −0.02 
Volatility 
Mean  0.0557  0.0550  0.0007  0.43 
Median  0.0509  0.0479  0.0030  1.58 
Std. Dev.  0.0213  0.0214  0.0000  −0.02 
Annualized portfolio turnover rate 
Mean  1.0562  0.6484  0.4079***  11.59 
Median  0.9909  0.4389  0.5521***  9.77 
Std. Dev.  0.5526  0.5002  0.0524**  2.09 
Inception year 
Mean  1998.7  1993.5  5.2***  9.91 
Median  2000  1995  5.0***  4.78 
Std. Dev.  6.6  7.3  −0.7**  −2.16 
Market Factor 
Mean  1.0940  1.0674  0.0267  1.48 
Median  1.0787  1.0330  0.0457***  3.12 
Std. Dev.  0.2652  0.2250  0.0402  1.54 
SMB Factor 
Mean  0.3863  0.2949  0.0913***  3.27 
Median  0.3416  0.2153  0.1263***  4.46 
Std. Dev.  0.3912  0.3875  0.0037  0.13 
HML Factor 
Mean  0.1284  −0.0221  0.1504***  4.65 
Median  0.1140  0.0113  0.1028***  3.72 
Std. Dev.  0.4333  0.3926  0.0406  1.42 
Momentum Factor 
Mean  −0.0083  −0.0085  0.0003  0.02 
Median  −0.0019  −0.0109  0.0089  0.71 
Std. Dev.  0.2740  0.1796  0.0944***  3.95 
Number of institutions 





Comparison of Self-Reporting and Non-Reporting Matching Fund Companies 
Panel A shows the performance measures of the self-reporting fund companies and the non-reporting 
fund companies. All return performance measures are calculated at the monthly frequency assuming the 
companies hold their most recently disclosed quarter-end holdings. Raw return is the portfolio returns without 
adjustment.  Excess return is the portfolio return in excess of the CRSP value-weighted return. One-Factor Alpha 
and Four-Factor Alpha are the intercepts from CAPM one-factor and Carhart (1997) four-factor models using all 
available data. Panel B repeats the analyses in Panel A except using a sample of non-reporting fund companies 
that is matched with the sample of reporting fund companies through the procedure described in Table 6. The t-
statistics for the differences are reported. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level respectively. 
 
Panel A:  Comparison of Return Performance 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   Raw return  Return in excess of the market  One‐Factor Alpha  Four‐Factor Alpha 
Self‐reporting fund companies 
5th Percentile  −0.0178  −0.0139  −0.0096  −0.0105 
25th Percentile  −0.0019  −0.0011  −0.0010  −0.0021 
Median  0.0047  0.0017  0.0016  0.0009 
75th Percentile  0.0095  0.0048  0.0047  0.0038 
95th Percentile  0.0164  0.0108  0.0117  0.0086 
Mean  0.0025  0.0009  0.0014  0.0005 
Std. Dev.  0.0112  0.0082  0.0067  0.0059 
# funds  366  366  355  355 
Non‐reporting fund companies 
5th Percentile  −0.0322  −0.0183  −0.0137  −0.0109 
25th Percentile  −0.0073  −0.0025  −0.0018  −0.0021 
Median  0.0028  0.0011  0.0009  0.0006 
75th Percentile  0.0095  0.0041  0.0039  0.0032 
95th Percentile  0.0185  0.0120  0.0124  0.0105 
Mean  −0.0006  0.0000  0.0005  0.0003 
Std. Dev.  0.0178  0.0107  0.0083  0.0081 















   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




5th Percentile  0.0144***  0.0043  0.0041  0.0004 
[3.05]  [1.19]  [1.53]  [0.18] 
25th Percentile  0.0054***  0.0015**  0.0008  0.0000 
[4.37]  [2.09]  [1.28]  [−0.03] 
Median  0.0019**  0.0007**  0.0007  0.0003 
[2.09]  [2.04]  [1.75] *  [1.20] 
75th Percentile  0.0001  0.0007  0.0007  0.0006 
[0.11]  [1.19]  [1.41]  [1.31] 
95th Percentile  −0.0021  −0.0011  −0.0007  −0.0018 
[−0.74]  [−0.58]  [−0.42]  [−1.23] 
Mean  0.0031***  0.0009  0.0009*  0.0003 




Panel B:  Comparison of Return Performance – Matched Sample 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   Raw return  Return in excess of the market  One‐factor alpha  Four‐factor alpha 
Self‐reporting fund companies 
5th Percentile  −0.0181  −0.0146  −0.0113  −0.0105 
25th Percentile  −0.0020  −0.0009  −0.0007  −0.0020 
Median  0.0047  0.0018  0.0017  0.0010 
75th Percentile  0.0095  0.0048  0.0047  0.0039 
95th Percentile  0.0156  0.0108  0.0113  0.0092 
Mean  0.0024  0.0009  0.0015  0.0005 
Std. Dev.  0.0113  0.0082  0.0067  0.0059 
# funds  366  366  355  355 
Non‐reporting fund companies 
5th Percentile  −0.0134  −0.0091  −0.0088  −0.0069 
25th Percentile  −0.0025  −0.0013  −0.0009  −0.0012 
Median  0.0045  0.0013  0.0014  0.0008 
75th Percentile  0.0091  0.0040  0.0048  0.0032 
95th Percentile  0.0174  0.0118  0.0119  0.0098 
Mean  0.0032  0.0013  0.0017  0.0011 
Std. Dev.  0.0096  0.0065  0.0061  0.0051 
# funds  366  366  357  357 
Differences (t‐statistics) 
5th Percentile  −0.0047*  −0.0055*  −0.0025  −0.0036** 
[−1.66]  [−1.81]  [−1.11]  [−2.21] 
25th Percentile  0.0004  0.0004  0.0002  −0.0008** 
[0.40]  [0.68]  [0.35]  [−2.34] 
Median  0.0002  0.0005  0.0003  0.0002 
[0.24]  [1.05]  [0.65]  [0.54] 
75th Percentile  0.0005  0.0008  −0.0001  0.0007 
[0.66]  [1.38]  [−0.24]  [1.20] 
95th Percentile  −0.0018  −0.0009  −0.0007  −0.0006 
[−1.28]  [−0.64]  [−0.46]  [−0.40] 
Mean  −0.0008  −0.0004  −0.0002  −0.0005 
   [−1.06]  [−0.79]  [−0.37]  [−1.32] 
 
 
